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Introduction 
In recent decades, governments across the global North have liberalized their service markets and 
privatized major service providers with the aim of reducing prices, improving service quality, and 
enhancing competitiveness and innovation. Incumbent firms have responded by restructuring 
employment within and across organizational boundaries, as well as experimenting with new 
approaches to work organization and human resource management (HRM). These firms face similar 
challenges, such as reducing the size the of the workforce, adjusting skills to new technologies and more 
differentiated markets, and reducing labour costs while improving productivity and customer service. 
However they have adopted very different strategies to meet these challenges – with significant 
implications for the structure and quality of service jobs. 
This report presents the findings of a three-year study comparing the different approaches that 
incumbent telecommunications firms in Europe and the USA have taken to restructuring service jobs 
over the past two decades. The study was motivated by a concern with the conditions under which 
‘mutual gains’ can be achieved that benefit both employers and employees, over a period when 
management is under increased pressure to reduce labour costs and downsize employment. In an 
industry where markets are rapidly becoming more competitive and internationalized, have the former 
monopolists adopted different restructuring strategies – and if so, what explains these differences? 
Under what conditions are employers more likely to adopt ‘high road’ practices, investing in high pay, 
skills, and opportunities for employees to participate in decision-making? To what extent do these kinds 
of high road practices benefit both a broad cross-section of employees and their employers – and what 
factors make it more difficult to realize mutual gains? Is there any evidence to suggest that certain best 
practice models can be sustained or replicated in other settings?  
To answer these questions, we compared approaches to employment restructuring in ten major 
incumbent telecommunications firms in Europe and the USA. Case study companies were chosen from 
countries representing different national ‘models’, recognized for having distinctive sets of labour 
market and corporate governance institutions. These included: 
1) Nordic: TDC (Denmark) and TeliaSonera (Sweden) 
2) Centre European: Deutsche Telekom (Germany) and Telekom Austria/ A1 (Austria) 
3) Mediterranean: France Telecom/ Orange (France) and Telecom Italia (Italy) 
4) Anglo-American: BT (UK) and AT&T (USA) 
5) Central and Eastern European (CEE): Telekomunikacja Polska/ Orange Polska (Poland) and 
Český Telecom/ O2 Telefónica Czech Republic (Czech Republic) 
These countries have important historic differences in institutions across a range of areas – including 
collective bargaining coverage and extension mechanisms, employee participation rights, training 
systems, employment protection rules, and transfer of undertakings legislation. These, in turn, can be 
expected to affect both the ability of employee representatives to influence management practice as 
well as the scope for companies to exercise strategic choice as they restructure employment. Each case 
study firm also has faced distinctive constraints or resources from its history of civil service employment, 
collective agreements, ownership structure, and past practice. Through comparing changes in strategy 
over time, we are able to ask how these diverse institutions and stakeholder relationships influenced 
practices and outcomes at incumbent telecommunications firms. 
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In order to trace differences in employment practices and outcomes, we focused on two major 
employee groups: technicians and call centre employees. These two areas were chosen because they 
represent a large share of service employment at our case study companies, and have been the target of 
restructuring and work reorganization. 
The data collection had two parts.  
First, we analysed changes in organizational restructuring strategies and their impact on employment 
and pay structures at all ten case study firms. In each country, we created a database of major 
‘restructuring measures’ between 1995 and 2010 – including downsizing, subsidiary creation and spin-
offs, relocation or consolidation, and outsourcing. These measures were identified through newspapers 
and trade publications, company annual reports, the Thomson Banker One database, and in-depth 
interviews with management and employee representatives. We distributed a survey to union, works 
council, and management representatives in which we asked about the numbers of jobs affected by 
these measures and accompanying negotiations or social plans. We also gathered data through this 
survey and our interviews on collective bargaining institutions at each company and on pay structures 
for call centre and technician jobs. In four of our cases – Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia, AT&T, and 
BT – we were also able to collect historic pay data, allowing us to compare changes in pay levels and 
structures over time. 
Second, we conducted more in-depth case studies comparing approaches to work reorganization and 
associated human resource management practices in five case study firms – one from each ‘national 
model’ described above. These included TDC (Denmark), Deutsche Telekom (Germany), France 
Telecom/ Orange (France), BT (UK), and Telekomunikacja Polska/ Orange Polska (Poland). In each of 
these cases, we conducted 20-50 interviews with management and employee representatives, as well as 
site visits involving interviews with local management, employee representatives, and supervisors at 
technician and call centre workplaces. Interviews focused on the recent evolution of work organization 
and skills, performance management, and working time or scheduling arrangements – allowing us to 
analyse key differences in the overall approach to organizing similar jobs and motivating employees 
within these jobs. 
Altogether, we conducted over 150 interviews with management and employee representatives, 
supplemented by archival data, surveys, and institutional databases.  
 
Structure of the report 
In this report, we summarize the main findings of the comparative study described above, in a format 
intended to communicate these findings to industry representatives and policy-makers. To this end, we 
provide both analysis and recommendations based on our analysis. Throughout the report, we highlight 
examples of ‘best practices’, focusing on cases in which restructuring and work reorganization have 
benefited employers while securing outcomes important to employees: high pay, job security, 
professional discretion or autonomy, and opportunities to develop and use skills. 
In section 1, we provide background on the case study firms, including trends in markets and ownership 
patterns; as well as labour market and industrial relations institutions at firm and national level. These 
factors set the context for an analysis of restructuring strategies and outcomes in three areas: 
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 Downsizing and employment adjustment (Section 2): In this section, we discuss strategies the case 
study firms have adopted to adjust workforce numbers and skills in response to changes in markets 
and technologies. We first compare approaches to managing downsizing and consolidation. These 
show variation in policies between companies and over time, as well as in the extent of cooperation 
or conflict with employee representatives over these policies. We then examine mitigating policies 
negotiated between employers and unions, including redundancy packages, retraining, and 
relocation assistance.  
 
 Diversifying employment contracts (Section 3): A second category of restructuring encompasses a 
variety of measures that result in changes to or diversification of employment contracts for certain 
employee groups, typically as a means of enhancing flexibility in increasingly differentiated and 
cost-conscious markets. This can occur within the firm, through the introduction of new job titles or 
employment terms and conditions for the existing workforce or through the creation or acquisition 
of subsidiaries with different structures of pay and conditions. Diversification of employment 
contracts can also occur across firm boundaries, through the sale of subsidiaries or establishments 
or through the increased use of different combinations of subcontracting and temporary agency 
contracts. In this section, we first summarize and compare the different measures that incumbent 
firms have adopted to diversify employment contracts. We then ask what impact have these 
measures had on pay and working conditions for similar employee groups. We focus on technician 
and call centre jobs to analyse outcomes, although we include a wider range of jobs in our overall 
description of strategies. 
 
 Work organization and human resource management (Section 4): In this section, we compare 
current approaches to work organization and human resource management across the case study 
companies, and analyse how changes in these practices have been negotiated with employee 
representatives. We focus on call centre and technician jobs at TDC, Deutsche Telekom, France 
Telecom, BT, and Orange Polska, where we conducted more in-depth research involving site visits 
and interviews with management at multiple levels. The discussion is organized around two areas 
of employment practice: 1) work organization and skills, including job specialization, training and 
development activities, and use of teams; and 2) performance management, including variable pay, 
performance evaluation, coaching, and monitoring. 
In each section, we compare practices adopted by employers with a view to both analysing the factors 
that contribute to the development of different strategies in each area, but also to drawing out some 
‘best practices’ that represent strong mutual gains for employees and employers. These are highlighted 
in case study boxes throughout the report. The final section presents conclusions and policy 
recommendations following from the findings presented in the report. 
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Section 1 
The context of restructuring: Markets, ownership, and institutions 
The telecommunications industry has transformed over the past two decades from one organized 
around national markets and dominated by state-owned public telecommunications operators (PTOs) or 
regulated monopolies to a highly competitive and internationalized ‘information services’ industry. This 
shift was partially due to technological changes, as costs of establishing competing networks fell and 
new market segments such as mobile, internet, and cable began to compete directly with telephone 
services. It has also been driven by changes in regulation and ownership. National governments in 
Europe fully or partially privatised their PTOs – in the mid-1980s in the UK and in the 1990s in the rest of 
Europe – and passed laws aimed at curtailing their market power. EU directives were central to the 
timing and form of these regulatory changes, as they required member states to end monopolies and 
establish full competition by 1998. In the USA, following an anti-trust lawsuit, the monopoly provider 
AT&T had to relinquish control of its regional subsidiaries which were established as seven Regional Bell 
Operating Companies.  
The case studies we focused on in this study went through similar changes in markets and ownership. 
However, they experienced key differences in several areas. These include: 
 Market liberalization  
 Ownership and finance 
 Collective bargaining and labour market institutions 
We briefly summarize some key differences in each area below. 
The liberalization of telecommunications markets occurred at different times and rates across 
countries. The USA and UK passed legislation in the mid-1980s promoting competition in certain 
markets, such as long distance; but incumbent firms continued to have protected markets in certain 
areas. For example, in the USA, full competition was introduced in the long distance market in 1984, but 
the ‘Regional Bells’ maintained their monopolies in regional local calls markets until 1996. BT competed 
in a ‘duopoly’ with Mercury Communications from 1982 until 1990, when licences to operate fixed-line 
networks were opened up to a wider range of companies.  
Elsewhere in the EU, the timing of liberalization was influenced by a Council of Ministers directive in 
1993 requiring all EU member states to end monopolies on telecommunications network infrastructure 
and voice telephony services by January 1, 1998. Denmark, Austria, Germany, France, and Italy all 
introduced similar legislation complying with this directive between 1996 and 1998 (see Table 1.1). 
Sweden was a distinctive case: the telecommunications market was largely unregulated, with the state-
owned provider Televerket holding a de facto rather than a formal or regulated national monopoly. The 
government began to allow competitors to connect to Televerket’s network in 1980. The company's 
monopoly on phones and telephone exchanges ended between 1985 and 1989.  
A third pattern is in the Central and Eastern European countries where strategic foreign investors 
(France Telecom in the Polish and Telefónica in the Czech case) acquired a stake, and later a majority 
stake, in Telekomunikacja Polska and Český Telekom respectively. Neither Poland nor the Czech 
Republic were EU members in 1998; however, liberalisation was required as part of both countries' EU 
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accession negotiations. Hence, the national monopoly was abolished in 2001 in the Czech Republic and 
in 2003 in Poland.  
Table 1.1: Market liberalization and privatization of incumbent firms 
 Year first 
public share 
offering 
Year fully 
privatized 
or (% state 
ownership) 
Year market 
liberalized 
(fixed-line 
segment) 
Market 
share (fixed-
line 
segment) 
2010* 
TDC 1994 1998 1996 67% 
TeliaSonera 2000 (51%) 1993 59% 
A1 2002 (28%) 1998 55% 
Deutsche Telekom 1995 (32%) 1998 52% 
France Telecom 1997 (27%) 1998 51% 
Telecom Italia 1997 2003 1997 56% 
BT 1984 1993 1990 39% 
AT&T 1885 1885 1996 N/A 
O2 Telefónica CR  1995 2005 2001 60% 
Orange Polska 1998 2010 2003 57% 
* Source: European Commission (2010) 
These differences in the timing and pace of market liberalization are important in the context of this 
study because they affect incumbent firms’ market power, as well as the intensity of pressure for radical 
measures to downsize and restructure employment in different time periods. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
changes between 1999 and 2010 in market share of incumbent firms in the local or national market for 
fixed-line calls, which are traditionally the largest market segment for incumbents, as well as the target 
of government efforts to increase competition. This shows that most firms experienced a steep fall 
between 1999 and 2005. For example, France Telecom’s market share fell from 97% to 71% over this 
period, dropping further to 53% by 2010. In most countries, the drop in market share stabilized between 
2005 and 2010. However, patterns differ by country. BT experienced the most dramatic drop in market 
share between 2005 and 2010, falling from 60% to 39% while TDC’s market share increased somewhat 
from 66% to 69%.  
Figure 1.1: Change in market share of incumbent firms in local or national market, fixed-line calls 
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Sources: EU countries from European Commission (2012); USA from Federal Communications Commission (2013 
and 2007) Note: 1999 and 2005 data for Germany, France, Italy, UK. Czech Republic, and Poland refer to local 
market only. US data refer to market share of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs -- former RBOCs) in local 
market. 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the percentage of employees in the telecommunications industry of each country 
that are employed by the incumbent firms. This provides a different set of measures for the comparative 
importance of each incumbent in its national market. For example, while Deutsche Telekom has an 
average market share relative to the other firms, it represents a larger proportion of total industry 
employment. We see that TeliaSonera, BT, AT&T, O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, and Orange Polska all 
represent less than 40% employment . 
Figure 1.2 % employees in the telecommunications industry of each country employed by the 
incumbent firm, 2010* 
 
Source: Company reports and Union surveys; Total employment in telecommunications industry from: a) USA: 
Current Population Survey, CIC 6680 ‘wired telecommunications carriers’ and CIC 6690 ‘other telecommunications 
services’; b) Austria: 2004 estimate EIRO (2005); c) Germany: Bundesnetzagentur (2011); other countries: Eurostat 
(2013): ‘Number of persons employed’ in NACE [J61]  
A second area in which the case studies differ is ownership structures and changes in ownership over 
time. The most obvious difference is in patterns of government or state ownership of incumbent firms 
(see Figure 1.3). Again, the Anglo-Americans are distinctive here: AT&T was a regulated natural 
monopoly, with no state ownership, while BT was the first European operator to be privatized – with a 
majority of shares sold to the public in 1984 and the remaining government-held shares sold in 1993. 
The other European countries held onto majority government ownership for longer, but, again, differed 
in the timing and extent of privatization. TDC and Telecom Italia are both fully privatized, with no 
government ownership; while TeliaSonera has the highest state ownership, with shares owned by both 
the Swedish (46%) and Finnish (19%) states. 
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Figure 1.3 Average % state ownership of incumbent firms 
 
Source: Thomson Banker One Note: Average % ownership calculated by time period 
 
The decline of state ownership has been accompanied by a growth in foreign ownership, or 
shareholdings by institutions or individuals based outside of the incumbent’s home country. Figure 1.4 
illustrates differences in the percentage of foreign-held shares between the incumbents and how these 
have changed over time. In all cases, we see some increase. However, again, patterns differ. France 
Telecom shares were still largely held by French investors in the late 2000s, with only 15% foreign 
ownership; while TDC was over 75% foreign-owned.  
Figure 1.4 Average % foreign ownership of incumbent firms 
 
Source: Thomson Banker One Note: Average share ownership calculated by time period 
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These ownership patterns can be attributed in part to differences in how shares were sold or acquired – 
and in particular the role of cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In some cases, 
major telecommunications operators based in other countries acquired majority ownership. For 
example, Telekomunikacja Polska in Poland was acquired by France Telecom (and subsequently re-
branded Orange Polska), and Český Telecom was acquired by O2 Telefónica. TDC in Denmark was 
acquired by Ameritech, which was subsequently taken over by SBC; and then in 2005 a majority stake in 
the company was acquired by a consortium of five private equity funds based primarily in the USA and 
UK. TeliaSonera was formed by a merger between the former state-owned firms Telia (Sweden) and 
Sonera (Finland) in 2002. In other cases, acquisitions or takeovers occurred between domestic firms, 
such as the takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti in 1999 – carried out through a system of “Chinese 
boxes” in which a chain of holding companies was created with each company owning a (typically 
minority) part in the next company.  
A final difference is in the source of finance incumbent firms rely on. One distinction is the debt ratio, or 
the percentage of a company’s assets provided via debt (compared to equity) (see Figure 1.5). Many 
companies took on debt in the early to mid-2000s to finance acquisitions and expansion. For example, 
France Telecom doubled its debt ratio from 24% in 2000 to 48% in 2003 to finance a wave of 
international acquisitions. BT saw even larger increases, from 14% in 2000 to nearly 60% in 2002. TDC 
shows a different pattern of nearly doubling its debt ratio in all three time periods shown in Figure 1.5 – 
which can be attributed to its majority ownership by private equity funds. 
Figure 1.5: Average debt ratio of incumbent firms 
 
Source: Thomson Banker One Note: Average debt ratio calculated by time period 
 
These different patterns of ownership and finance have had an impact on the pressures management 
faces to maximize cash flow and reduce costs, as well as goals and objectives pursued through 
restructuring. Traditionally, companies in continental European countries have relied on more long-term 
forms of finance or ‘patient capital’, characterized by cross-shareholding between large firms and bank-
based loans. This has been argued to reduce pressures for short-term growth and cost-cutting more 
typical of the more liberal and financialized Anglo-American countries. The state has been one of the 
most patient shareholders, with a longer term view to infrastructure investment. 
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The changes in finance and ownership detailed above have meant that all of our case study companies 
have experienced increased pressure for maximizing shareholder value and securing short-term returns. 
At the most extreme end is TDC in Denmark, where ownership changed dramatically over a short 
period, with majority (foreign-based) private equity ownership and large debt ratios. However, even 
where shareholdings continue to be more concentrated and held by national investors and the state, 
major institutional investors appear to have become more important in encouraging radical forms of 
restructuring. For example, although the private equity investor the Blackstone Group owns 4.4% of 
Deutsche Telekom shares, union and management representatives observed in interviews that it was 
highly influential in encouraging outsourcing and subsidiary spin-offs in the mid-2000s. Continued state 
ownership of incumbents may have some impact on corporate governance and strategy – for example, 
the French state encouraged a change in leadership at France Telecom after a wave of employee 
suicides in the mid-2000s. However, increasingly national governments seek to avoid direct intervention 
in management decision-making at incumbent firms.  
Finally, overall performance or profitability has an influence on restructuring pressures and strategies in 
different periods. Figure 1.6 shows average return on assets for the case study firms. This measures net 
income in relation to average total assets, or the profitability of assets in generating revenue. In most 
cases, the period 2000-2004 shows the largest drop in ROA – a time when most incumbents were 
adjusting to a large drop in domestic market share while financing a wave of domestic and international 
acquisitions. However, again, we see variation across companies, with TDC showing stable and high ROA 
rates and TeliaSonera and BT maintaining overall high ROA.  
Figure 1.6: Average Return on Assets (ROA) for incumbent firms 
 
Source: Thomson Banker One Note: Average ROI calculated by time period 
 
The above summary shows some of the ways in which markets, ownership, and finance patterns differ 
across our case study firms and in different time periods. Institutions at the national and company level 
also play an important role in influencing how incumbents respond to pressures from markets and 
investors. 
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One set of institutions concern collective bargaining. Table 1.2 summarizes the major collective 
bargaining institutions and actors in each country.  
Table 1.2: Collective bargaining institutions in the telecommunications industry 
 Major labour 
union(s)  
Sectoral 
agreement 
Employers’ 
Associations  
Company-level bargaining 
institutions  
Denmark  Dansk Metal 
HK Privat 
Yes – but 
competing 
agreements  
Dansk Industri and 
Dansk Erhverv 
 
Samarbejdsudvalg 
(cooperation committees) 
have consultation rights but 
no co-determination rights  
Sweden UNIONEN 
SEKO 
Yes Almega IT 
employers 
 
no works councils; unions 
have strong consultation 
rights, but no co-
determination rights 
Austria GPA 
GPF 
Yes – but 
does not 
include 
incumbent 
Austrian Federal 
Economic 
Chamber, 
Wirtschaftsbereich 
Telekommunikation 
Betriebsräte (works councils) 
have strong consultation and 
co-determination rights with 
veto across a wide range of 
management areas 
Germany ver.di 
IG Metal 
IG BCE 
No None with 
collective 
bargaining role 
 
Betriebsräte (works councils) 
have strong consultation and 
co-determination rights with 
veto across a wide range of 
management areas 
France CGT-PTT 
SUD-PTT 
F3C-CFDT 
CFTC 
CFE-CGC 
FO 
Yes UNETEL Comités d’entreprise (works 
councils), délégués du 
personnel (workforce 
delegates), délégués syndicaux 
(union representatives), and 
CHSCT, les Comités d'Hygiène, 
Sécurité et des Conditions de 
Travail (health and safety 
councils) have information 
and consultation rights but no 
co-determination rights 
Italy SLC-CGIL 
FISTEL-CISL 
UILCOM-UIL 
UGL-COM 
Yes ASSTEL (from 2002) Rappresentanze Sindacali 
Unitarie are elected union 
representatives with 
information and consultation 
rights but no co-determination 
rights 
UK CWU 
Prospect 
No None Unions represent employees 
through contract enforcement 
(via grievances); bargaining 
rights limited 
USA  CWA 
IBEW 
No None Unions represent employees 
through contract enforcement 
(via grievances); bargaining 
rights limited 
Czech OSZPTNS Yes Český svaz No works councils; unions 
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Republic OOPR zaměstnavatelů 
pošt, 
telekomunikací a 
distribuce tisku 
have consultation rights, but 
no veto rights 
Poland SKPT NSZZ 
Solidarność 
and FZZPT are 
representative 
 
No Konfederacja 
Pracodawców 
Polskich and 
PKPP Lewiatan 
Rady pracowników (works 
councils) have limited 
consultation rights 
 
First, the structure and coverage of collective agreements in the telecommunications industry differs 
across the ten countries. One major difference is the structure of collective agreements at industry level. 
In Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, Italy and the Czech Republic, employers’ associations negotiate 
sectoral collective agreements with peak union confederations that cover almost all of the 
telecommunications workforce. Germany stands out as the only western European country without 
these institutions – despite having a tradition of industry-level agreements in other sectors. As in most 
countries, there was no structure of sectoral bargaining before market liberalization because there was 
only one major employer. However, these institutions were set up between the mid-1990s and early 
2000s in other countries with a tradition of sectoral agreements. In Denmark and Sweden, the 
incumbents voluntarily joined employers’ associations in the mid-1990s, and applied agreements 
followed by a majority of telecommunications firms. In Austria, France, and Italy, all employers in the 
industry are formally covered by agreements – in Austria, due to mandatory membership in employers’ 
associations, and in France and Italy due to different mechanisms used by the state to extend 
agreements to all firms. This has resulted in close to 100% bargaining coverage, although, as described 
in the sections below, this typically does not include employees working for subcontractors or under 
different forms of contingent contracts. In the Czech Republic, the sectoral framework agreement 
establishes certain broad parameters for pay and conditions, but detailed agreements are then 
negotiated at company level. In the UK, the USA, and Poland, agreements primarily cover the incumbent 
firm or firms.  
A second important difference concerns the degree of union competition. We observe four patterns. In 
Denmark, Austria, and Germany one major union is present in the incumbent and a different union or 
unions represent employees at most other major telecommunications firms. The Czech Republic is 
distinctive in having one major union both in the incumbent and for the industry. In Sweden, the UK, 
and the USA, multiple unions are present in the incumbent but represent clearly delineated groups, with 
no or minimal competition. In France, Italy, and Poland, multiple unions compete for members and 
influence within the incumbent – Poland being the most extreme case with about 20 unions present at 
Orange Polska.  
Finally, bargaining rights and structures at company level differ across the countries (see last column in 
Table 1.2). This affects the areas in which employee representatives are able to influence management 
strategy, as well as their bargaining power in negotiations over restructuring. Works councils in 
Germany and Austria have among the strongest co-determination rights, giving them a veto over 
management decisions in areas such as the implementation of new technology. In Denmark and 
Sweden, elected workplace representatives are more closely tied to the unions and have weaker formal 
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rights, and so are heavily dependent on union bargaining power and management’s willingness to 
cooperate. Formal bargaining rights are weakest in the UK, the USA, Poland, and the Czech Republic. 
Figure 1.7 shows a comparison of union membership density and bargaining coverage for the 
telecommunications industry in each country. These figures are union reported (with the exception of 
the USA), and in many cases unions were not able to estimate density or coverage. However, they 
provide a rough comparison. Based on these figures and interviews with stakeholders, we can observe 
three different patterns: in the Nordic countries, the telecommunications industry has both high union 
density and high bargaining coverage; the Centre European and Mediterranean countries have low 
density but high coverage; and the Anglo-American and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
have low coverage with low density. Differences in bargaining coverage and variation within each group 
can be explained by the different mechanisms available to extend collective agreements in the 
continental European (non-CEE) countries. In countries with high coverage, we would expect there to be 
less pressure to negotiate concessionary agreements with unions, as all companies would be covered by 
the same minimum terms and conditions. However, as we will see below, incumbent firms often have 
company agreements with more generous terms; while the substantive impact of sectoral agreements 
on pay and working conditions for different categories of employees differs substantially across the 
cases. 
Figure 1.7: Union density and bargaining coverage for the telecommunications industry of case study 
countries 
 
Sources: European countries: estimates by union representatives (2011-2012); USA: 2012 data from the Current 
Population survey, 'Wired telecommunications carriers' and 'Other telecommunications services', Hirsch & 
MacPherson (2013) 
Note: union density figures not available for Austria, France, and the UK; bargaining coverage figures not available 
for the UK, Czech Republic, or Poland 
 
There is also variation in bargaining structures within the incumbent firms’ ‘corporate groups’. First, 
they differ in the degree of bargaining centralization. For example, TDC and Deutsche Telekom both 
have separate agreements and pay structures for subsidiaries, with some coordination between them. 
AT&T has a large number of collective agreements, with differing terms by region for similar employee 
groups. In contrast, Telecom Italia closely follows the pay and conditions outlined in the sectoral 
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agreement, with small differences in bonuses and terms across its subsidiaries; while France Telecom 
has a standard model for pay and variable pay that applies across the corporate group.  
Second, several of the incumbents employed or continue to employ civil servants covered by separate 
collective bargaining structures. TDC, TeliaSonera, A1, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom all had a 
large proportion of their workforce at the time of privatization who were civil servants, with distinctive 
rights and pay structures – typically including lifetime job security and more generous pension 
arrangements. These companies negotiated different arrangements for transitioning these employees 
to private contracts or allowing them to retain their status (see details in Table 1.3 and in Section 2). The 
continued presence of civil servants or former civil servants with strong job protections has had a 
significant impact on downsizing and outsourcing measures. 
Table 1.3 Civil servants at incumbent firms 
Company % civil servants 
at incumbent 
2010 
Changes in civil servant status with privatization  
TDC [36%]* Civil servants lost their status, but kept pension (10-15% 
higher) and right to 3 years’ salary if made redundant 
TeliaSonera 0 At time of privatization, employees had to give up civil 
servant status if they remained at Telia 
A1 75% Civil servants kept their status across the corporate group 
Deutsche Telekom 35% Civil servants could keep their status, but had to give it up if 
transferred to subsidiaries (with right of return) 
France Telecom 70% Civil servants kept their status across the corporate group 
 * percentage refers to former civil servants  
 
Another point of comparison is union density within the incumbent firms. Figure 1.8 shows that most 
incumbents continue to have high union membership rates – in all cases higher than the industry as a 
whole. BT and AT&T have maintained very high rates, at or above 90%. While there is a general pattern 
of membership decline, this is not universal: unions reported that membership has increased at 
TeliaSonera and Telecom Italia. These density figures provide some indication of unions’ strength and 
mobilization potential. 
Figure 1.8 Average % union membership density in incumbent telecommunications firms 
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Source: Union and management estimates. Notes: Historic membership density at AT&T is calculated based on % 
membership at AT&T, BellSouth, Ameritech, Southwestern Bell, and Pacific/Nevada Bell – which through M&As 
make up the current company ‘AT&T’. No data was available for France Telecom. Union density data for Telecom 
Italia do not include data for UIL and UGL. 
A final difference related to collective bargaining is the degree of cooperation or conflict between 
employee and management representatives. We asked union representatives to describe the 
relationship between the union and management at different time periods, based on a scale ranging 
from ‘very conflictual’ (1) to ‘very cooperative (7). Figure 1.9 illustrates their responses. This shows a 
deterioration in four of the case studies: TDC, TeliaSonera, A1, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom. 
However, BT shows an improvement over time, while Telecom Italia, O2 Telefónica, and Orange Polska 
all experienced a decline in the period 2000-2004 followed by an improvement in recent years.  
Figure 1.9 Level of labour-management cooperation: 1=very conflictual, 7= very cooperative 
 
Source: survey of union representatives from each company. Answer to question: ‘How would you describe the 
relationship between the union and management at these different time periods? Please indicate on the scale 
below from [1] very conflictual to [7] very cooperative.’ 
A final area of national labour market institutions that may influence restructuring are legislated 
employment protections. Employment protections in Denmark and the Czech Republic are among the 
weakest in Europe, meaning employers face few restrictions to laying off or dismissing employees. In 
Sweden, the Employment Protection Act includes more strict provisions on notification periods and 
priority rules (‘last in, first out’). However, unions and employers’ organisations at the central level can 
negotiate or approve deviations; and central unions are able to delegate the power to negotiate 
deviations to local union representatives – giving employers a strong incentive to negotiate these plans 
with unions. In Austria, Germany, France, and Italy, formal employment protections for employees on 
permanent contracts are stronger, but contingent contracts typically have weaker protections and can 
be lower paid. There are also provisions in several of these countries for short-time work arrangements, 
allowing employers to reduce or suspend working hours during temporary crises with state-supported 
salary replacement. National legislation in Poland, the UK, and the USA provides weak employment 
protections, but unions have negotiated often very strong agreements protecting job security for 
incumbents’ employees. In addition, across Europe, transfer of undertakings rules require employers to 
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adhere to collective agreements for a period after outsourcing or spinning off an establishment to a new 
owner; while firms in the USA do not face these restrictions. These different national frameworks of 
rules and restrictions affect the costs associated with different restructuring strategies, as well as the 
bargaining power of unions as they seek to influence these strategies.  
The above discussion has illustrated some of the ways in which markets, ownership and finance 
arrangements, and institutions differ across the incumbent firms and the countries in which they are 
based. It has also shown changes in each of these areas over time. In the following sections, we examine 
how these factors have influenced restructuring strategies and outcomes. 
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Section 2 
Downsizing and employment adjustment  
In this section, we discuss strategies the case study firms have adopted to adjust workforce numbers 
and skills, focusing on the period between 1995 and 2010. We first compare approaches to managing 
downsizing and consolidation. This shows variation in policies between companies and over time, as 
well as variation in the extent of cooperation or conflict with employee representatives over these 
policies. We then examine alternatives to redundancies negotiated between employers and unions, 
including reduced hours arrangements and retraining measures.  
 
1. Downsizing and redundancy policies 
 
All of the incumbent firms have downsized their workforce over the past two decades. Changing 
ownership structures, the emergence and intensification of competition, as well as technological 
advances that rationalised many work processes together created strong pressures to reduce 
employment. These trends led to massive downsizing, with companies shedding between 38% and 72% 
of their workforce in the 1995-2010 period. Figure 2.1 illustrates the percentage change in employment 
at incumbent firms in their home countries between 1995 and 2010.  
 
Figure 2.1 % change in employment at incumbent firms within their home countries, 1995-2010 
 
 
 
Note: Change in employment for FT from 1996; CT from 1997; TA, OP and TI from 1998. Figures for AT&T include 
former BellSouth, Ameritech, Southwestern Bell, Pacific/Nevada Bell, and SNET. 
Downsizing intensity, as well as labour conflict associated with downsizing, varied greatly between firms. 
At BT, AT&T, and O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, for example, downsizing occurred through a gradual 
process that accompanied these incumbents’ transformation from simple fixed-line providers to more 
sophisticated multimedia companies. All three also maintained largely cooperative relations with their 
unions in this area, without substantial strikes or protests over redundancy measures. In other 
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countries, downsizing at incumbent firms was carried out during concentrated periods, often associated 
with large restructuring plans. As discussed below, there was often a high degree of cooperation around 
the time of market liberalization and/or privatization, with generous voluntary redundancy and early 
retirement plans. However, nearly all of the companies experienced a period in the 2000s of often 
intense labour conflict over changes in these terms.  
One factor contributing to the degree of conflict or cooperation with labour concerned redundancy 
policies, including the use of voluntary or compulsory redundancies, and the terms of early retirement 
and voluntary redundancy packages given to employees. Table 2.1 summarizes the policies negotiated 
at incumbent firms between the late 1990s and early 2000s; and changes in terms of redundancy 
packages by the early 2010s. 
Table 2.1 Redundancy policies at incumbent firms 
 Redundancy policies (late 1990s – early 
2000s) 
Change in terms, mid-2000s – 2010s 
TDC - voluntary redundancies 
- non-civil servants: 1 year’s paid leave; up to 3 
months paid training 
- former civil servants: up to 3 years’ paid leave 
- compulsory redundancies introduced  
- non-civil servants: between 3 and 6 
months paid leave  
 
TeliaSonera - voluntary redundancies 
- 3-year preparation period for another job, while 
being employed by Telia  
- Early retirement at 57 
 
- from 2008 new agreement: 2-year 
preparation period for another job, while 
being employed by Telia  
– can take money or early retirement 
A1 - voluntary redundancy 
- early retirement, severance pay  
 
- compulsory redundancies introduced 
- increasing emphasis on early retirement 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
- early retirement and voluntary redundancy 
- from 2002: some compulsory redundancies 
from positions, but moved to ‘Vivento PSA’ 
subsidiary 
 
- increased transfer of civil servants to 
public sector 
- working time reduced in 2004 to avoid 
redundancies 
 
France 
Telecom 
- early retirement at 55; employees received 70% 
of their salary and a bonus of 60% of 1 year's 
salary 
- early retirement plan ended 2006 
- from 2009 senior employees could work 
50% of their regular hours while being paid 
80% of a full-time salary 
Telecom 
Italia 
- early retirement and voluntary redundancy; 
employees received up to 90% of their salary  
-re-training 
- ‘solidarity contracts’ introduced; working 
time reduced for many employees to avoid 
redundancies 
BT - voluntary redundancy and early retirement 
- pre-2001: employees taking voluntary leave 
received a voluntary redundancy payment and 
up to 6.7 years enhancement of their 
pensionable service 
- from 2001 'NewStart': for each year of service 
employees received a month's salary, up to a 
maximum of 12 months. The first £30,000 was 
tax-free.  
- NewStart terms have been reduced over 
time: from a 12-months to a 3-9 months 
payment; and the pension option was 
withdrawn 
 
AT&T - compulsory redundancy, voluntary redundancy 
and early retirement 
- severance pay based on years spent in the 
company: maximum 104 weeks pay for over 30 
years of service 
- compulsory redundancy declined  
- increased use of VTP in ‘non-surplus’ 
conditions 
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- ‘Voluntary Term Pay’ (VTP) allowed a more 
senior employee to take their full termination 
pay if they volunteered to take redundancy 
Orange 
Polska  
- voluntary redundancy and early retirement 
- severance pay specified in the collective 
agreement 
 
- severance pay increased due to being 
linked to the more generous 'social 
package' (2000-2004) and subsequent 
agreements 
O2 
Telefónica 
Czech 
Republic 
- partly voluntary but largely forced redundancies 
- severance pay above the level required by law 
- early retirement 
- partly voluntary but largely forced 
redundancies 
- further increases in levels of severance 
pay 
- early retirement 
 
At TeliaSonera, a collective agreement with the union gave redundant employees a generous package of 
benefits from the mid-1990s, including training and early retirement – ensuring no involuntary 
dismissals and giving employees 3 years to find new jobs within or outside the company. However, 
union representatives reported that labour relations deteriorated in 2008, leading to increased conflict 
as well as reinterpretation of existing agreements. A new agreement in 2010 provided employees with 2 
rather than 3 years of salary when they were downsized, with the option of taking the money or a 
pension through early retirement; and no additional funds for further training or redeployment within 
TeliaSonera.  
In Denmark, unions at TDC were able to negotiate favourable agreements during the first wave of 
downsizing in the late 1990s, which ensured that nearly all redundancies were voluntary, and which 
gave employees one year’s salary paid and up to three months training paid by the employer. The 
second major wave of redundancies occurred between 2003 and 2004, before the takeover by the 
capital funds in 2005. After the takeover, management adopted a policy of cutting 5-6% of the 
workforce a year. In some years those targets rose to 8-10%. Subsequent agreements on redundancy 
packages were also less generous.  
Until 2001, BT offered a voluntary leavers’ package that offered certain employees a maximum 
enhancement of their pensionable service of up to 6.7 additional years. In other words, if an 
employee who was 53 years old retired, she could take her pension early with no adverse financial 
consequences.1 In 2001, BT introduced a new early leaver payment called 'NewStart' providing some 
additional payments based on years of service (see case study box below). At its peak, NewStart 
provided a twelve-months payment. However, the terms of NewStart have been reduced over time, 
with a current minimum of three months and a maximum of nine months.  
Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and A1 were constrained by the large proportion of civil servants at 
each firm who could not be dismissed, as well as by collective agreements protecting private law 
employees from compulsory redundancies. From 1995, Deutsche Telekom offered a generous early 
retirement programme as well as bonuses for employees taking voluntary redundancy. At France 
Telecom, one union signed an agreement on voluntary retirement in 1996, in which employees were 
able to leave ‘pre-retirement’ when they were 55 with 70% of their salary and a bonus worth 60% of one 
year's salary. Around a third of the workforce took early retirement under these terms between 1996 
                                                          
1
 This maximum enhancement was applicable provided that it did not take retirees past the age of 60. For example, if an employee retired at 
59, she would receive an enhancement up to 60 but not beyond.  
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and 2006, when the agreement was terminated. In addition, a large number of civil servants were 
transferred to the public sector over this period: for example, over 1,600 transfers were made between 
2003 and 2004. Conflict with the unions intensified after France Telecom’s controversial NEXT plan was 
announced in 2006, which included a 3-year plan for 22,000 redundancies and 14,000 job changes. 
Following a ‘social crisis’ in which a wave of employee suicides were associated with aggressive 
restructuring policies, France Telecom negotiated a series of social accords with the unions aimed at 
improving the working environment. In 2009, France Telecom negotiated a plan for senior employees 
that allowed them to work 50% of their regular hours while being paid 80% of a full-time salary. The plan 
was adjustable, so part-time could be accumulated to allow an employee to leave earlier.  
Both Deutsche Telekom and A1 made use of leasing firms that received transfers of large numbers of 
civil servants (and other employees) and could hire them out back to the respective firm and to other 
firms. In 2002, ver.di and Deutsche Telekom negotiated an agreement that allowed the company to 
move employees who wanted to remain with the company after their jobs were made redundant into a 
new subsidiary called Vivento Personal Service Agentur (PSA), a ‘temporary employment and 
qualification company’. These employees were then placed in different divisions for short term projects, 
or recruited to fill new job openings. Vivento was set up as a temporary agency that would also offer 
services on the private market, but this segment grew too slowly to employ the thousands of redundant 
workers. Deutsche Telekom initially maintained these employees’ former pay level when they moved to 
Vivento; although subsequent agreements reduced pay when employees were not working. Deutsche 
Telekom also used Vivento to transfer civil servants to other areas of the public sector – representing 
9,000 employees in the 2008-2010 period. 
A similar strategy was adopted at A1 in 2008. However, it was met with substantially more labour 
conflict than at Deutsche Telekom. McKinsey's 'Target09' programme involved transferring civil servants 
to an existing leasing firm (Österreichische Industrieholding AG) that could hire them out to other firms. 
This was derisively called an attempt to create a 'Beamtenparkplatz' (parking lot for civil servants). The 
employees rejected the plans, and the union threatened strikes. In the end, transfer to the pool was 
voluntary, and certain incentives such as wage security, the right to take up one's previous employment 
and training were offered. A1 also increasingly made use of a new form of early retirement. In total, 
about 2,500 civil servants whose jobs had become redundant were given pre-retirement leave in return 
for a reduced salary.  
At Orange Polska, downsizing accelerated in 2000. After some protests over early downsizing moves, the 
unions managed to negotiate a social package that was available from 2000 until 2004. This guaranteed 
that there would be no collective redundancies and guaranteed additional severance pay, above the 
level stipulated in the collective agreement. Thus, if an employee had worked for Orange Polska for 25+ 
years, she would be entitled to 15 times the individual average monthly salary of a staff member in the 
last three months of employment. However, some unionists charged that employees were compelled to 
leave despite a formal policy of only voluntary redundancies. There were many related disputes and 
union protests over downsizing between 2001 and 2005. After the company announced a new round of 
redundancies in 2005, the unions held a strike referendum, leading to a nation-wide strike (which 
management considered illegal) and a hunger strike. After several weeks, the conflict ended with 
management modifying its original proposals by increasing the amount of severance pay. Moreover, the 
agreement also prohibited attempts by management to coerce ‘voluntary’ resignations.  
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In all of the cases discussed above, redundancy payments were reduced over time. Telecom Italia, AT&T, 
and O2 Telefónica Czech Republic were exceptions to this, with stable or increasingly generous 
redundancy policies. As in most of the incumbents, Telecom Italia and its unions agreed on a no-
dismissals policy, instead making use of early retirements and re-training. The Italian government 
provided a form of unemployment insurance that gave employees a minimum replacement income for 
their salary for two years in northern Italy, and three years in southern Italy. Thus, employees were 
encouraged to take voluntary redundancy when they were 2-3 years from retirement age, with an 
added incentive that TI topped up retirement pay allowing them to receive 90% of their salary. This 
downsizing procedure was first implemented in 1995 and had not changed by the late 2000s.  
At AT&T, management has relied on a combination of involuntary layoffs and voluntary leave, with 
increased use of voluntary redundancy over time. The level of termination payments for employees who 
were involuntarily laid off were linked to seniority, with a maximum of 104 weeks pay for employees 
with over 30 years of service. Because of this, more junior employees were typically selected first for 
layoffs. Prior to the early 1990s, more senior employees could volunteer to take the place of more junior 
employees, but they would get only the level of termination pay that the junior employee was eligible 
for. This was replaced by ‘Voluntary Term Pay’ (VTP), which allowed a more senior employee to take 
their full termination pay if they volunteered to take redundancy. This was originally intended to be 
used only when a surplus was declared. However, an arbitration case in the early 2000s held that AT&T 
could offer VTP at any time. Union representatives observed that management had used VTP to replace 
permanent employees with subcontractors, as it allowed management to by-pass terms in the collective 
agreement stating that work could not be outsourced if employees performing that work had been laid 
off. Another programme called ‘Extend-comp’ allowed redundant employees who were close to 
pensionable age to stay on the payroll until they became ‘pension eligible’, with rights to be called back 
to work for temporary assignments. 
At O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, redundancy has become more generous over time. Until 1995, if an 
employee was dismissed, he or she was entitled only to the legal minimum amount of severance pay. In 
1996, the union negotiated an increase in the severance payment based on age, years left until 
retirement or years spent in the company. This varied at different points in time; however, the union 
had to drop its attempt to secure a single level of severance pay for all employees leaving the company. 
The level of severance pay has gradually been growing, both nominally and in comparison to current pay 
levels.  
Both the form downsizing has taken and labour conflict over downsizing policies varied between 
countries. Conflict was probably most severe at France Telecom and Orange Polska, where management 
practices to encourage voluntary resignations were perceived to be particularly aggressive. TeliaSonera, 
TDC, A1, and Telecom Italia had a high level of conflict over downsizing during certain periods, which 
took the form of strikes or organized protests. However, all four also maintained a tradition of labour 
management cooperation in negotiations over these plans. Conversely, downsizing was characterised by 
particularly cooperative relations between unions and management at BT, O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, 
and Deutsche Telekom. This is due to the gradual nature of downsizing, strong job security protections 
against compulsory redundancies, as well as the relatively generous social packages that accompanied 
redundancies. Still, as we will see below, Deutsche Telekom generated significantly more labour conflict 
with other policies to consolidate jobs and outsource large areas of work, which contributed to massive 
job losses and created more substantial disruption for employees.  
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2. Consolidation and relocation 
Consolidation, or a concentration of tasks in a smaller number of locations, has been another important 
trend. These measures are related to downsizing, as they directly affect the existing workforce, and 
often are accompanied by some form of redundancy. Even if employees are formally offered the 
possibility to move and ‘follow their jobs’ to a new location, they often decide to leave the company. 
Downsizing was often linked to moves from a regional to a more centralised structure. For example, in 
1996, TDC brought together six regional companies, which was accompanied by planned workforce 
reductions of around 2,500 employees between 1997-1998. A similar process took place at O2 
Telefónica Czech Republic after 1998 and at Orange Polska in 2005.  
In 1995-1999, Telecom Italia started a process of centralisation towards Rome, which was occurring at 
the same time as the first round of redundancies. The agreement negotiated between the union and 
management tried to avoid redundancies through employee transfers from areas with staff surpluses to 
understaffed areas. Telecom Italia paid relocation costs, gave financial support for buying a new house, 
and offered salary increases and a part-time position for family members at Telecom Italia.  
Consolidation of call centres has been particularly common, and was typically part of an efficiency drive 
to bring down call handling time and increase sales. BT announced in 2002 that it would close about 50 
out of 150 of its call centres and consolidate the work in 16 new generation call centres. Unions 
negotiated over this process, so that BT retained a larger number of locations than initially planned, and 
the chosen locations ensured an even geographical spread of the remaining call centre work. Moreover, 
the unions prevented any compulsory redundancies connected with the consolidation by insisting on 
reskilling and redeployment. AT&T (and the former Regional Bells that merged into AT&T) also 
dramatically consolidated call centres over time. For example, Ameritech reduced its centres by more 
than half between 1995 and 1996; SBC closed centres in California and moved the work to lower-cost 
locations in the Southwest in the early 2000s; and BellSouth closed two-thirds of its centres in 2002. In 
these cases, management provided some relocation incentives as well as ‘guaranteed job offers’ in cases 
of redundancies; however, a minority of employees took these offers, resulting in thousands of job 
losses.  
O2 Telefónica Czech Republic and TeliaSonera both reduced the number of their call centres by two 
thirds. At O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, only about 50 people transferred to new locations while 450 
left their jobs. They received severance pay above the level required by law, as negotiated by the union 
for all downsizing measures. TeliaSonera consolidated its call centres from 25 to 8 locations in 1998-
1999. The union had agreements in place on relocation that ensured employees were offered jobs in the 
expanding locations, as well as providing relocation assistance for employees and their families.  
TDC has also sought to create efficiencies through consolidation and relocation with a focus on call 
centre and technician jobs. There were two major consolidation ‘events’ in recent years, both of which 
occurred in 2008. One involved the concentration of TDC customer call centres to Denmark's four 
largest cities. Seven call centres, with 280 employees, were closed, and most of the affected employees 
quit. Around the same time, TDC also consolidated its field technician operations. This involved shutting 
down local offices in 13 regional departments, cutting 70 technical positions at those locations, and 
relocating a proportion of the workforce. Those who did not wish to relocate were either laid off or left 
voluntarily.  
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At Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, consolidation was at least partially tied to the creation of a 
leaner management structure. France Telecom consolidated engineering and call centre functions 
between 1993 and 2006, which was related to a gradual centralisation of the company structure and to 
a reduction in the size of the workforce. These changes were associated with the large-scale movement 
of employees to different jobs across the company described in the section below, and accelerated after 
2006  - contributing to massive conflict with the unions during this period. A mobility agreement in 2009 
committed the company to halting systematic closures of locations and concentration of work in larger 
cities; although some consolidation continued to occur as employees retired from smaller locations. 
At Deutsche Telekom, the most contentious consolidation measures have targeted call centres. In 2006, 
DT announced plans to close 45 out of its 96 call centres. The company offered internal transfers to the 
3,300 employees affected. In 2008, DT announced a plan to close 39 of its call centres by 2011 and 
consolidate the jobs in 24 centres. 8,000 of 18,000 call centre workers would be offered jobs at the 
remaining operations. Ver.di led a series of protests, and management eventually agreed to keep 33 
centres open through 2012 and to maintain job security provisions. Generous social plans were also 
negotiated to help employees relocate, including a balance of interests, an indemnity, and various 
subsidies for child care and travel costs. Additional costs were compensated for a period of up to 3 
years. However, location migrations led to very high turnover, largely because of long commuting 
distances.  
At Orange Polska, in the run-up to the creation of the subsidiary OCS in 2010, several call centres were 
consolidated. A special 'allocation system' was negotiated by the unions, whereby if workers agreed to 
move, the company would pay for the move and for these workers to establish themselves in a new city. 
In 2012, these benefits involved a one-time payment and a refund for a loan. Between 2009 and 2012, 
873 employees received allocative benefits, with a decreasing tendency as the consolidation neared its 
conclusion.  
The above discussion shows that while there has been some conflict over consolidation, typically unions 
succeeded in negotiating agreements that compensated employees through generous relocation 
packages or some form of assistance in commuting or moving to a new location. TDC is distinctive in 
offering very little relocation assistance for employees. BT, Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
represent distinctive cases in which unions succeeded in negotiating agreements committing 
management to keep certain locations open or to modify past consolidation plans.  
3. Alternatives to redundancies: Short-time working and retraining 
The incumbent firms also negotiated measures that sought to reduce the need for redundancies 
through reduced hours or short-time working and retraining existing employees for jobs in growth 
areas. 
Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telekom both negotiated agreements to reduce working hours, which 
followed announcements of job cuts and associated labour conflict. Telecom Italia signed an agreement 
in 2010 with the unions at the Ministry of Labour that created so-called 'solidarity contracts' for short-
time work arrangements. The workers affected had to take a pay-cut in order to prevent collective 
redundancies. The agreement also stipulated the organisation of specific courses for the professional re-
training and re-employment of workers covered by the Solidarity Contract. If Telecom Italia employees 
affected by solidarity contracts attended a re-training class in their remaining time, they were fully 
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remunerated. Deutsche Telekom similarly negotiated an employment pact in 2004 with its union that 
reduced working time from 38 to 34 hours, with only partial wage compensation – meaning employees 
would be paid for the equivalent of a 35.5 hour work week. Civil servants also had their weekly working 
time cut, even though they were not officially covered by the agreement, but retained their full pay. In 
return, management extended job security protections until the end of 2008.  
Most companies in this study have offered certain retraining opportunities, but a few introduced some 
fairly sophisticated training programmes to mitigate downsizing. Unions tend to be in favour of re-
training, which they see as an alternative to redundancies. Indeed, retraining programmes were often 
developed against the background of no-layoff guarantees. 
 
At BT, a broad retraining strategy was formulated in the context of the company's eschewal of 
compulsory redundancy (see case study box below). The CWU supported redeployment and retraining 
and, even when they involved unpopular measures such as retraining engineers into call centres, played 
an important role in communicating the company strategy to the affected employees. 
Case study: Voluntary redundancy and retraining at BT 
In 1995, BT employed 150,000 people in the UK. In 2013, it employed 75,000. Redundancy plans were 
based on voluntary leave and early retirement throughout this period, and were negotiated based on 
close partnership between management and unions. Until 2001, BT offered a voluntary leavers’ package 
that offered certain employees a maximum enhancement of their pensionable service of up to 6.7 
additional years.  
In 2001, the company's redundancy package 'NewStart' was introduced. Initially, if somebody was given 
NewStart, they would also be given a full pension and very generous conditions: for each year’s service, 
employees would get a month's salary, up to a maximum of 12 months. The first £30,000 would be tax-
free. This was often accompanied by additional incentives to encourage people to leave voluntarily – for 
example, they would receive three months' extra if they decided to leave by a certain date. The terms of 
NewStart were reduced over time, and are currently capped at nine months' pay.  
At the same time, the CWU negotiated a ‘commitment for commitment’. This meant that the company 
would try very hard to keep those made redundant in employment. In return, the union would 
encourage these employees to accept retraining and redeployment into a new position. This work would 
normally be in their old location or within a certain distance of the old location. Interviewees estimated 
that tens of thousands of employees were redeployed through this programme.  
In 2008, BT established a BT Transitions Centre (BTTC) to facilitate the movement of groups of workers 
with similar skills, allowing the company to centralize redeployment and retraining functions. Initially 
large groups of employees in similar areas could be assisted at one time in the BTTC – for example, 200 
engineers would be moved from one function to another, receiving similar training and placement 
services. As surplus labour declined, the BTTC evolved from centralised planning of big movements of 
employees with similar skills to individualised placement. The target was to redeploy an employee 
within 3 months, with a 70% skills match – meaning the retrainee must have 70% of the skills for an 
advertised role. Thus, in most cases, engineers were retrained into engineering functions, administrative 
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jobs, or other types of support functions. Redeployed employees kept their terms and conditions as well 
as their previous pay and pension entitlements.  
In Sweden, TeliaSonera created a ‘staff support division’, in which employees were given training and 
job search assistance helping them to move to a new job within or outside of TeliaSonera, while being 
paid their regular salary. If they did not get a job, they had three years to prepare for another job – but 
continued to be employed at Telia during that time. The division was disbanded at the end of 1998; 
however, employees continued to be given three years to retrain for jobs within or external to the 
company until 2010. 
At A1 and Orange Polska, retraining programmes were identified as alternatives to downsizing after 
particularly conflictual periods. At A1, several hundred civil servants were retrained in 2008 with the 
intention of moving them to other public sector positions, e.g. at the police or the finance ministry. At 
Orange Polska, the climate changed after 2005, when workers of French-owned companies organised a 
strike in front of the French Embassy. Following this, the company created a rule to favour internal over 
external recruitment. The next rounds of redundancies were negotiated up front between the unions 
and management. To show goodwill, the company began to offer mitigating policies far beyond the 
requirements of the law. Policies included so-called mini-internships, where employees could see what 
jobs are available and decide whether they wanted to retrain. An intensive retraining programme was 
also offered (Program Przemieszczeń Pracowniczych) to build competencies in key business areas such 
as sales, customer service, marketing and technical support. Call centres were one of the most common 
places where redundant employees from other positions found work.  
France Telecom represents a distinctive case in which unions opposed retraining and redeployment 
programmes implemented by management. Civil servants in France Telecom had long been moved from 
areas with shrinking employment (such as technician areas) to those with expanding jobs (such as call 
centres and shops). These measures were associated with a reported 10-12,000 job changes a year by 
2000, up to 13,800 in 2001 – or almost 10% of FT’s workforce annually. Job changes were facilitated by 
civil servant mobility rules. The 2006 NEXT restructuring plan was accompanied by measures intended to 
accelerate these changes, including a policy at this time called ‘Time to Move’, which made it a 
requirement that employees change their job every three years - often combined with mandatory 
physical relocation. Management pulled back from this policy after the ‘social crisis’ of 2007-9, 
negotiating an accord stating that employee mobility should be voluntary. However, employees could 
continue to change their occupation or job through an intense (FT-provided) training course in an area 
where there was a particular need for recruiting additional employees – called ‘pathways to 
professionalization’.  
Policies aimed at retraining and working time reduction offered alternatives to redundancies that (at 
most firms) were widely regarded as providing ‘mutual gains’ to employees and employers. Training 
policies at TeliaSonera and BT were particularly innovative solutions to changing skill demands, and both 
designed and implemented in close cooperation with unions. However, interviewees observed that it 
was becoming progressively more difficult to retrain employees, as companies became leaner and as 
retraining opportunities became more specialised.  
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Comparison 
The case study firms all faced similar challenges in reducing the size of the workforce, adjusting to 
changing skill demands, and achieving economies of scale through consolidation. These often involved 
conflict with employee representatives, leading to different compromises that protected employees 
through enhanced job security or investment in skills.  
We observed some differences across the cases. First, the timing and intensity of downsizing varied. In a 
few companies, this was a gradual process but in others, downsizing came in waves around changes in 
ownership or in the shape of often controversial plans. Typically more gradual downsizing involved a 
lower degree of conflict with employee representatives.  
 
Second, the case studies adopted different policies for managing redundancies, including voluntary or 
compulsory redundancies, the level of enticements such as early retirement plans or severance 
payments, and the extent of investment in retraining or redeployment of the existing workforce. 
Differences in these policies can be attributed to several factors.  
 
First, the sources of union bargaining power or leverage in negotiations over redundancies differed. This 
was linked in large part to the level of employment security at the company or national level. At 
TeliaSonera, management negotiated a very generous agreement in the mid-1990s that gave employees 
3 years to re-train or move within the firm. Management agreed to this structure in part because a 
collective agreement with the unions allowed them to by-pass more rigid legal requirements in Sweden, 
which required dismissals to be made according to a ‘Last In First Out’ order of priority; as well as 
priority rights for employees who had been dismissed to be re-employed. The collective agreement 
allowed Telia to suspend these rules, meaning management could keep employees who had the skills 
desired or required and could concentrate downsizing and retraining on employees in shrinking areas 
(Eurofound 2002). At other incumbents, similar incentives to negotiate generous redundancy packages 
or retraining and reduced working time measures were associated with strong job protections in past 
collective agreements or due to a large proportion of civil servants. 
 
Second, differences in redundancy policies can also be attributed to variation in the support provided by 
different national governments for early retirement and retraining. This influences the extent to which 
companies can externalise the cost of dismissals due to generous unemployment benefits or subsidies. 
For example, unemployment insurance in Italy gave employees a minimum replacement income for 
their salary for 2-3 years, and Telecom Italia complemented this with a ‘top up’ to encourage a state-
supported form of early retirement. In the Nordic countries, Italy, and France, different forms of training 
subsidies encouraged development of generous re-training and redeployment policies. 
 
At most of the incumbent firms, the terms of redundancy and early retirement plans became less 
generous over time. This can be attributed in part to a change in the conditions described above: unions 
lost a past source of bargaining power as employment protections weakened over time, due to declining 
numbers of civil servants and the gradual erosion of job security. However, an important contributing 
factor was increased pressures on management to reduce the cost of generous redundancy packages. 
Market liberalization, increased competition, and changing ownership structures combined with 
growing debt ratios pushed employers to pursue more aggressive cost-cutting across a range of areas. 
These pressures were particularly severe in firms that were purchased by multinationals or where large 
29 
 
ownership stakes were purchased by international investors pursuing short-term cost reduction. Finally, 
there is a significant role of management strategy: at several of the companies, including TeliaSonera, 
France Telecom, Orange Polska, and Telecom Italia, unions pointed to a period when labour relations 
deteriorated due to particularly poor relations with a top management team. At all of these companies, 
there have been recent changes in management that led to improved relations and renewed 
commitment to social partnership. 
A final difference between the incumbent firms concerned the decline in total employment over this 
period. One explanation may be that employers faced different formal constraints on their ability to 
reduce employment levels. As outlined above, employment protections were strongest in the 
companies that inherited large proportions of civil servants (A1, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom) 
and in countries that endowed workers with solid legal employment protections (Italy, Sweden), 
followed by companies that negotiated employment protections with their unions (BT, AT&T, Orange 
Polska). Employment protections were weakest in Denmark and the Czech Republic. However, the 
companies that lost the largest proportions of employees include those with weaker company-level 
employment protections, such as Orange Polska and O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, and those that had 
strong employment protections, such as A1 and TeliaSonera. As Figure 2.2 shows there is also no 
correlation between employment protection rules at the national level and the reduction in 
employment over this fifteen-year period.  
Figure 2.2 Relationship between the level of employment protection and % change of employment at 
incumbent, 1995-2010 
 
Note: Employment protection figures from OECD ‘Employment Protection Summary, weighted’. Includes measures 
for regular contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismissals – scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most 
restrictions). See www.oecd.org/employment/protection for weights used to calculate sub-indicators.  
Another explanation for differences may be change in market share: we would expect more downsizing 
to occur at those firms that experienced the largest drop in market share. However, as Figure 2.3 shows, 
there is also no clear relationship between decline in market share and the extent of downsizing. France 
Telecom experienced the largest drop in market share between 1995 and 2010, but had the smallest 
TDC 
TS 
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decline in employment over this period. Meanwhile, TeliaSonera had a relatively moderate decline in 
market share, but cut a large number of positions. 
Figure 2.3 Relationship between % change in market share and % change in employment at 
incumbent, 1995-2010 
 
Note: Employment protection figures from OECD ‘Employment Protection Summary, weighted’. Includes measures 
for regular contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismissals – scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most 
restrictions). See www.oecd.org/employment/protection for weights used to calculate sub-indicators.  
Part of the explanation for the lack of a clear relationship to employment protections or change in 
market share is that the decline in total employment at incumbent firms was linked to broader 
restructuring policies, including outsourcing or spin-offs of different business areas; as well as increased 
use of temporary agency employees. The companies with the most significant change in employment – 
Orange Polska, O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, and TeliaSonera – all outsourced most of their technician 
jobs over this period. The following section compares these policies to diversify employment contracts 
across the companies, which were carried out parallel to the redundancy, consolidation, and retraining 
policies described above and also were strongly shaped by collective negotiations with employee 
representatives.  
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Section 3 
Diversifying employment contracts 
The above section compared approaches to downsizing and redeployment of staff, with the objective of 
adjusting workforce numbers and skills to changing market demands. A second category of restructuring 
encompasses a variety of measures that result in changes to or diversification of employment contracts 
for certain employee groups, typically as a means of enhancing flexibility in increasingly differentiated 
and cost-conscious markets. This can occur within the firm, through the introduction of new job titles or 
employment terms and conditions for the existing workforce or through the creation or acquisition of 
subsidiaries with different pay and conditions. Diversification of employment contracts can also occur 
across firm boundaries, through the sale of subsidiaries or establishments or through the increased use 
of different combinations of subcontracting and temporary agency contracts. While these measures can 
be motivated by a range of objectives, they have similar effects in either bringing about a change in pay 
and conditions within the incumbent firm or across employees performing similar jobs for the 
incumbent’s subcontractors, subsidiaries, and temporary agencies.  
In this section, we first summarize and compare the different measures that incumbent firms have 
adopted to diversify employment contracts. We then ask what impact these measures have had on pay 
and working conditions for similar employee groups. We focus on technician and call centre jobs to 
analyse outcomes – although we include a wider range of jobs in our overall description of strategies.  
1. Introduction of new job categories or pay scales in-house 
In many of the case study firms, employers negotiated agreements with employee representatives that 
created parallel job categories – typically for new employees – with different pay and conditions from 
the existing workforce.  
One way that this occurred was through the introduction of private law contracts in workplaces that 
traditionally employed a large proportion of civil servants. Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and A1 
have separate structures of pay and conditions for private law employees, as civil servants’ pay 
continues to be set by or negotiated with the national government. France Telecom has attempted to 
equalize the pay between the groups, through adopting a salary supplement that aligns the salary of civil 
servants with its private law employees. However, there continue to be differences – for example, civil 
servants receive automatic seniority-based pay increases not available to private law employees. At 
TDC, over half of former civil servants lost their status when the company was privatized, but the union 
was able to negotiate exceptions that allowed these employees to keep their civil servant pension, as 
well as the right to up to three years’ salary if made redundant. At all of these companies, civil servants 
have a higher degree of job security than private law employees. 
A second trend in many companies has been negotiation of ‘two-tier’ collective agreements, with newly 
recruited employees entering on a lower pay scale and often less generous conditions than existing 
employees in similar jobs. For example, when Telecom Italia joined the new collective agreement 
negotiated for the telecommunications industry in 2000, it applied the terms of this agreement to all 
new hires, with the existing workforce retaining a separate structure of pay and conditions based on TI’s 
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former, more generous, company agreement. Holidays were reduced by three days for employees’ first 
ten years, they lost the right to an additional (14th) month’s wage, and the number of seniority levels 
was reduced by half – to seven from fourteen. The agreement also allowed management to hire 30% of 
the workforce on temporary contracts, which made it possible to further differentiate employment 
contracts in this way.  
In the USA, the CWA negotiated a number of lower tier job titles at the companies that merged into 
AT&T, resulting over time in large variation in pay and conditions for certain employee groups, 
particularly for certain categories of lower skilled call centre employees and technicians. The union often 
negotiated these contracts in exchange for bringing certain subcontracted jobs in-house or retaining 
jobs in-house; although it was often able to improve pay and conditions over time. For example, AT&T 
agreed to in-source around 3,000 DSL help desk jobs into call centres under a lower-paid “Tier 1” title, in 
what was at the time called the ‘AT&T Internet Services’ contract. The new company also negotiated a 
new customer service title for existing call centre employees, in which 40% of pay was based on 
commission from sales. Under the agreement, employees were given the option to move to the new 
title, but were able to move back to the old title if they were dissatisfied. Another important source of 
differentiation at AT&T is the variety of different regional contracts with widely varying pay scales and 
conditions for similar jobs, due to historic differences in collective agreements. 
Similar to AT&T, BT also negotiated agreements in 2006 and 2012 that committed the company to 
reducing the share of agency and offshore work. The 2012 agreement involved union concessions in 
return for work being brought back from India: a salary that was lower than the pay of existing 
permanent grades, longer hours and less favourable sick pay and scheduling arrangements. Both TDC 
and Deutsche Telekom have negotiated similar agreements with their unions that establish different 
contract terms for new call centre employees. At TDC, new hires are not paid for their lunch breaks 
during their first 11 months; while at Deutsche Telekom, pay is around 30% lower for new employees 
compared to former pay scales. 
2. Creation and acquisition of subsidiaries  
A second set of strategies for diversifying contracts within firms has occurred across a corporate group, 
through either the acquisition of subsidiaries or the creation of new subsidiaries.  
First, some firms have acquired new companies and continued to operate them as independent 
subsidiaries, preserving some differences in pay and conditions between core and subsidiary employees. 
TDC acquired the call centre subcontractor Call Centre Europe in 2002; NetDesign, a provider of IP/LAN 
infrastructure for business customers, in 2004; and a number of ‘no-frills’ brands (for example, mobile 
phone virtual providers) between 2004 and 2011, which retained their own separate networks of call 
centres and stores. Pay and conditions at these companies differed from those at TDC at the time of 
purchase, as they either had agreements with different unions or no collective agreements. Call Centre 
Europe and the no-frills brands had lower pay levels for similar call centre and retail employees and 
more extensive use of variable pay compared to TDC’s in-house workforce (see discussion of pay below), 
while NetDesign technicians enjoyed higher pay compared to TDC technicians serving business 
customers. These differences were retained, and the subsidiaries continue to have different pay 
structures and conditions compared to internal TDC employees. 
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Another example of this strategy is Telecom Italia’s (TI) creation of the call centre subsidiary Telecontact 
in 2001. Telecontact both opened new centres on greenfield sites and purchased existing call centre 
subcontractors, expanding over time through acquisitions. For example, Telecontact purchased 20% of 
its former subcontractor Atesia and internalized a proportion of its workforce. Similar to TDC’s Call 
Centre Europe, Telecontact was used as an internal subcontractor while simultaneously selling services 
to external clients. While employees were covered under the same sectoral agreement as the TI 
workforce, they did not receive the annual bonus secured for core employees in a TI company 
agreement, they were on lower pay scales due to their relative youth, and many were initially hired on 
part-time and temporary agency contracts.  
The purchase of these subsidiaries allowed employers to introduce lower cost structures for certain 
types of work or for jobs serving particular (often lower value) market segments without reducing or 
renegotiating terms and conditions for existing employees. However, these differences often affected 
the core workforce through benchmarking or employee transfers. For this reason, unions have sought to 
narrow the gap between pay and conditions at subsidiaries. For example, the unions at TI negotiated a 
company-level agreement with Telecontact on variable pay in 2007, which almost closed the wage gap 
between TI call centre agents and Telecontact employees; and in 2008 they achieved the transition of 
1,600 20-weekly-hour contracts into 30-weekly-hour contracts, and the takeover of 300 agency workers 
as permanent employees. Their ability to negotiate these improvements was helped by their success in 
organizing members at the subsidiary, which had around 40-50% membership density. 
A second kind of subsidiary strategy pursued by incumbent firms has involved establishing new 
subsidiaries and moving some portion of the existing workforce into these companies. This often has 
entailed some renegotiation of collective agreements or a change in pay and conditions over time. 
Subsidiaries established for different market segments or business services often become ‘profit 
centres’, responsible for balancing their own books or selling services to the corporate group, which 
increases short-term cost pressure on management and the workforce. It can also be a first step to 
concentrating work in a certain area before spinning it off or selling it to a third party (discussed below).  
One motivation for establishing new subsidiaries has been the need to respond to changing regulation 
of different market segments - for example, requirements that incumbents separate their fixed and 
mobile networks. To examine the impact this had on employment contracts, it is useful to compare 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) and France Telecom (FT), which (similar to many incumbents) established or 
purchased subsidiaries for expanding mobile phone and internet market segments. In both corporate 
groups, civil servants had the option to transfer from core wireline business units to subsidiaries with 
rights of return. However, the majority of the workforce in new subsidiaries was hired externally, and 
thus covered by the company’s private sector agreements. This intensified the difference in contractual 
arrangements, as core business units serving fixed line segments had a larger proportion of civil 
servants.  
In both companies, terms and conditions for similar groups of employees at the subsidiaries also came 
to diverge over time. At FT, central collective agreements were extended to the new subsidiaries. 
However, this was coupled with a series of separate company-level agreements. In 1997, a ‘social 
agreement on employment’ at FT defined a two level bargaining procedure, whereby a central 
agreement is followed by bargaining between local management and union representatives. The 
subsidiaries Orange (mobile) and Wanadoo (internet) initially had their own bargaining process and 
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rules. This was replaced by a global negotiation structure, with one agreement governing base pay, job 
classifications and promotion criteria. However, rules varied based on the status and trajectories of 
employees. At DT, T-Mobile negotiated a separate company-level agreement; and T-Online never 
concluded an agreement with the union, despite ongoing negotiations. Employees transferred to T-
Online from other parts of DT were able to keep their former working conditions, but new employees 
were brought in under a variety of pay scales. The presence of separate (or no) collective negotiations 
for DT’s subsidiaries resulted in much larger differences in pay and conditions compared to across FT’s 
subsidiaries, where the main difference was in a higher proportion of individual incentive pay.  
Both corporate groups re-integrated these market segments over time, to take advantage of market 
convergence through pursuing bundling strategies. This was also accompanied by a merger between 
groups of employees, with some attempt to standardize pay and conditions. In both cases, the mobile 
subsidiaries – with more flexible working conditions and a higher proportion of variable pay – served as 
the model for the new combined workforce. FT maintained separate call centres for fixed line and 
mobile markets (with some cross-selling), but by 2011 had standardized variable pay and work 
organization between them. Meanwhile, DT adopted a ‘shared services’ model, based on further 
subsidiary creation. Around the time that mergers were occurring between the subsidiaries, 
management shifted 50,000 of its technical service, technical infrastructure, and call centre jobs to three 
new subsidiaries, under the name ‘T-Service’. After some conflict, including a strike, the union and 
management eventually agreed to increase working hours without pay compensation for existing 
workers, increase or introduce variable pay, and reduce pay for new hires. 
An interesting contrast to Deutsche Telekom is Orange Polska, which shifted its fixed-line and mobile 
(PTK Centertel) customer service call centre employees into the new subsidiary Orange Customer 
Service (OCS) in 2010. Although there was an attempt by management to negotiate different terms and 
conditions for this group, in the end the unions negotiated an agreement that extended the same 
collective agreement and pension terms available to core employees – which constituted a gain for 
former Centertel employees. Employees also received a two-year employment guarantee and no salary 
reduction.  
AT&T and its predecessor companies (BellSouth, SBC, SNET) have also established subsidiaries with 
different pay and conditions – again, with a focus on call centre services. However, these typically did 
not involve employee transfer and were accompanied by negotiation of separate contracts or pay 
grades. For example, SNET set up a subsidiary in 1998 to sell outsourced call centre services to other 
companies. The union cooperated with this effort, and was able to represent employees, although at a 
wage that was around two-thirds that of in-house customer service and sales representatives. In 
another example, BellSouth created a new business unit called NDA/CA (National Directory and 
Customer Assistance) in the late 1990s that performed directory assistance services for BellSouth and 
other clients, with different benefits and a lower pay scale.  
3. Spin-offs and transfer of employees to subcontractors 
A related set of strategies resulting in changes to or differentiation of employment contracts involves 
the sale of subsidiaries or establishments to third party firms. This typically involves a shift of transferred 
employees to different collective agreements or pay structures. It can also be an indirect means of 
downsizing through reducing workforce numbers in-house and turning over responsibility for managing 
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future reductions to a third party firm. Most major incumbent firms have used these strategies in some 
form – with the notable exception of A1 and France Telecom. 
One set of activities that have been a target of subsidiary sales or outsourcing with staff transfer are 
various support services. Orange Polska started spinning off building administration and cleaning 
services in 1997. Since then many other activities have been sold to external companies, including 
drivers, couriers, security services, accounting, and remote computer maintenance. Telecom Italia spun 
off at least five units between 2000 and 2004 (IT, payroll, cars and maintenance, logistics, cleaning), 
resulting in the transfer of over 2,250 employees to other companies. DT sold its real estate and training 
subsidiaries in 2008, with partial employee transfer. TDC sold or outsourced a range of services between 
2005-2010, including the sale of TDC Directories (2005) and satellite business (2009). In most of the 
above cases, transferred employees maintained their pay and conditions for a transition period, under 
national transfer of undertakings rules or collective agreement, but then were switched onto new 
agreements – often with lower pay and terms.  
IT services have been one major target. Between 2003 and 2008, TDC transferred around 1,000 IT 
employees to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). They were able to keep their terms and conditions 
of employment for 2 years but then were moved to a new agreement under the service union HK. At 
different points in time, BT likewise transferred several hundred IT employees to companies such as 
Hewlett Packard, Computacenter, or Tech Mahindra. The employees involved were TUPE transferred 
which, under UK law, meant they would retain their terms and conditions. Telecom Italia progressively 
transferred most of its IT employees to companies belonging to the TI group until the creation of the IT 
subsidiary Shared Service Center (SSC) in 2003. In 2009, TI transferred 2,000 additional employees to 
SSC. SSC is covered by the sectoral agreement and has a second-level agreement for variable pay since 
2009.  
Several companies also externalised major areas of technician services. In two cases, this involved the 
externalisation of the mobile network. In 2008, TDC outsourced its mobile network operations to 
Ericsson, which became responsible for the operation, maintenance and expansion of its mobile 
network. This involved the transfer of 276 TDC employees – most of whom were technicians. However, 
unlike the CSC outsourcing deal, transferred employees remained under the TDC collective agreement, 
retaining their former terms and conditions of employment. This was because a large proportion of the 
employees were former civil servants, and Ericsson could not legally take over civil servant rights. More 
dramatically, BT sold its entire mobile subsidiary, O2, in 2001, affecting 2,000-3,000 employees.  
In Sweden, Poland, and the Czech Republic, incumbent firms outsourced either all or the majority of 
their fixed-line technician services. In 2001, Telia moved its business services and technician services 
into subsidiaries that were subsequently spun-off, involving the transfer of close to 11,000 employees. 
Today, TeliaSonera subcontracts all of its technician services to several competing companies, two of 
which were formed through these spin-offs. Similarly, Orange Polska spun off network services in 2002, 
involving the transfer of 6,000 service technicians to external companies. Telefónica O2 Czech Republic 
closed its own technical services between 2005 and 2011, shifting the work to external companies. In 
this case, only around 500 technicians were transferred to contractors, while around 2,000 technicians 
were dismissed – although many subsequently found work at the new subcontractors.  
All transferred employees in these cases maintained their pay and conditions when transferred to the 
subsidiaries and when subcontracted, remaining on their contracts for the duration of the collective 
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agreement. However, TeliaSonera was the only case in which transferred employees maintained pay 
and conditions over time (see case study box).  
Case study: Negotiating flexibility with equity at TeliaSonera 
TeliaSonera established a range of subsidiary companies for different business lines and activities. In 
each case, there was no renegotiation of collective agreements or change in terms and conditions of 
employment: ‘they move all their working conditions, salaries, everything, right over to the new 
company, because they use the same collective agreement’ (Interview, SEKO official, 28 May 2012). The 
most significant events involved the establishment and sale of subsidiary companies responsible for 
internal services and installation and network maintenance activities between 2001 and 2007. This 
affected close to 11,000 employees, most of who were transferred to subcontractors. 
In 2001, TeliaSonera formed the ‘Telefos Group’, made up of 9 formerly internal businesses with 5,600 
employees predominantly handling business services; and the ‘Orbiant Group’, made up of 6 companies 
with 5,400 employees responsible for network and maintenance as well as equipment installation and 
servicing. The venture capital firm Industrikapital purchased 51% of the Telefos Group in 2001, and each 
individual company was sold between 2001 and 2007. Flextronics purchased 91% of shares in the 
Orbiant Group in 2001 and the remaining 9% in 2002.  
As a result of these measures, nearly all of the field and network technicians formerly employed by 
TeliaSonera were transferred to subcontractors. Following a series of reorganizations and mergers, two 
companies emerged as major contractors: Relacom and Eltel. By 2012, TeliaSonera purchased almost all 
technician services from these contractors, as well as from Npower and MTS.  
TeliaSonera was the first major incumbent telecommunications operator to divest all of its network 
services. As a result of these sales, close to 11,000 employees were moved to subcontractors between 
2001 and 2007. Pay and basic employment terms and conditions were protected when employees were 
moved to the TeliaSonera-owned companies, and then when the companies were sold. Under Swedish 
law, employees continued to be covered by agreements for one year following a transfer of ownership, 
and then they could be moved onto new agreements, but with the same basic pay scale and pension 
rights.  
According to a union official, the local trade unions were closely involved at all stages of outsourcing, 
and were able to get favourable agreements to ease staff transfer and retraining: 
‘All these persons, they were moving from Telia to the new companies. And they looked after it so 
everyone would have a job after they left… when Telia sold it, all the people had these possibilities. But if 
they worked for TeliaSonera and were moved to this new company, and they don't want to move to this 
new company, they had special solutions for them. For instance, early retirement, they had possibilities 
to be educated. And they also could receive money to go out of the company and have two years of 
payment.’ (Interview, SEKO official, 28 May 2012) 
Employees at the new companies experienced some reduction in job security. One way that this 
occurred was through the replacement of permanent contracts with temporary contracts. In 2005, the 
temporary staffing agency Manpower launched ‘Manpower Network Services,’ and Relacom downsized 
its staff – many of whom got jobs at Manpower and then were sent back to Relacom as agency 
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employees on temporary contracts. This appears to be a model that all of the companies have followed. 
A union representative from one subcontractor estimated that 25-30% of its workforce was employed 
through temporary agencies (Interview, SEKO official, 10 May 2012).  
At the same time, employees transferred under these arrangements continued to be protected by 
collective agreements. Temporary agencies were required to pay employees the same salary as 
colleagues doing similar work. Agency employees had permanent contracts and received 90% of their 
salary during the time when no work was available in their area. This meant that the agency shared 
some of the risk of business fluctuations or seasonal changes in labour demand with the employee. The 
union also was able to negotiate agreements stating that the subcontractors could not hire temporary 
agency workers until 9 months had passed after layoffs; and within that time period, employees who 
were laid off had to be re-hired if there was a need for additional staff.  
At Orange Polska, the unions negotiated the programme 'Work for the worker' ('Praca za pracownika'), 
which provided additional job security for 1.5-3 years and a wage cut of about 15% but with financial 
inducements from the company (see case study box). 
Case study: 'Work for the worker' programme at Orange Polska  
Spin-offs of work processes and the workers performing them were one of the most prominent forms of 
downsizing at Orange Polska. Article 23 of the Polish labour code stipulates that benefits provided under 
the collective agreement must remain valid for at least 12 months.  
Orange Polska spun off network services in 2002, and 6,000 service technicians went to external 
companies. At this time, the unions negotiated the 'Work for the worker' ('Praca za pracownika') 
programme. In return for standing orders from Orange Polska, these external companies agreed to 
employ former Orange Polska employees on indefinite contracts and to guarantee them work for 1.5-3 
years, depending on the region of Poland. The new employment contracts were individually negotiated 
by workers, who took a wage cut of about 15% on average. However, Orange Polska paid them some 
fairly generous financial inducements (an average of 20 thousand złoty – or 4,000 GBP/ 5,000 Euros). 
The decision to move was voluntary, but if technicians decided not to move, they could be made 
redundant. The majority of affected employees took the opportunity to leave because the terms offered 
went far beyond what is required by Polish law. Even though work guarantees were only temporary, 
unionists considered this settlement to be quite advantageous.  
At Deutsche Telekom (DT), major spin-offs have affected both call centre and technician jobs. DT's 
subsidiary T-Online sold three of its five call centres in 2002 to different subcontractors. In January 2004, 
DT established two subsidiaries, Vivento Customer Services (VCS) and Vivento Technical Services (VTS), 
to handle the corporate group’s call centre work and technician work as well as to sell services in both 
areas to other firms. The two companies remained under the DT collective agreement, but the union 
agreed to a reduction in pay of 8.75% for existing workers, with a lower pay grade for new workers hired 
into the company. DT then sold 12 of its 19 VCS establishments to different subcontractors between 
2006 and 2008. Around 1,800 employees were affected. When T-Service was created in 2007, 1400 VTS 
employees were transferred to DT Technischer Service; and in 2008, the remaining 1,600 employees 
were transferred to Nokia Siemens Networks through a strategic partnership agreement. In all of these 
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cases, pay and conditions of transferred employees were protected for a transition period, but then 
were typically reduced to market levels more typical of the subcontractor sector.  
4. Increased use of flexible employment contracts: subcontractors and temporary agencies 
A fourth set of measures that differentiate employment contracts involves the use of subcontractors 
and temporary agencies. Similar to the spin-offs discussed above, these measures shift primary 
responsibility for employment contracts to a third party. However, unlike outsourcing with staff 
transfer, they do not represent a direct change in employer for the incumbent’s employees, with the 
possibility of a change in pay and/or conditions. Instead, this typically occurs parallel to downsizing or is 
used for business areas where the volume of work is expanding, in the place of internal hiring.  
It is more difficult to compare these forms of externalization as a series of restructuring ‘events’, as they 
often happen gradually over time. However, we can compare how companies use subcontractors and 
temporary agencies, as well as how pay and working conditions across employee groups have been 
shaped by negotiations with unions. We focus here on call centre and technician jobs, as details on 
overall strategies in this area are difficult to obtain. 
All of the incumbents outsourced or used temporary agencies for some portion of their call centre and 
technician work. This provides flexibility in ensuring services during ‘unsocial’ working hours (late nights 
and weekends), as well as for meeting peaks in demand. It can also provide access to expertise in 
particular areas – although most of the case study firms externalized primarily their most transactional 
or lower skilled areas of work. However, they used them in different ways (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). For 
example, TDC had a large number of temporary agency staff working in its call centres (estimated 20%), 
with some areas such as outbound sales staffed almost entirely by agency employees. France Telecom, 
Deutsche Telekom, and TeliaSonera appeared to be the highest users of subcontracting for call centres, 
representing between 30% and 40% of call centre jobs. The highest users of subcontracting for 
technician services were TeliaSonera, O2 Telefónica Czech Republic and Orange Polska – all of which had 
subcontracted all or a majority of their field technician services to third parties. Interestingly, TDC, 
Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom all used subcontractors for around 30% of jobs in field 
technician services. 
Figure 3.1 Estimated % of employees outsourced in field technician area (consumer segment) 2010-12  
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Note: These figures are based on estimates provided by interviewees, and so should be interpreted with caution. 
No figures were available for A1, AT&T, or Telecom Italia.  
Figure 3.2 Estimated % of employees externalized in call centres (consumer segment) 2010-12 
 
Note: These figures are based on estimates (sometimes rough estimates) provided by interviewees, and so should 
be interpreted with caution. No figures were available for A1, AT&T, or Telecom Italia. 
One factor influencing these strategies is the ability of incumbents to differentiate pay and conditions or 
achieve flexibility internal to the firm. For example, TDC, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia, BT, and 
AT&T all have call centre subsidiaries with lower pay and/or lower tier agreements for new employees, 
as described above. Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, and Telecom Italia also have differentiated terms and 
conditions within their technician workforce. Indeed, unions often negotiated these agreements 
introducing lower pay grades or increased flexibility in exchange for employer commitments to bring 
outsourced, offshored, or temporary agency work back in-house – or even as a precautionary measure 
to prevent further outsourcing. For example, TDC negotiated a flexible working time model with its 
union for field technicians, as part of a joint effort to reduce costs in-house following benchmarking of 
30% cost differences compared to subcontractors.  
Second, the structure of collective bargaining in each country can influence how employers use these 
strategies – in particular, the presence of encompassing collective agreements and the magnitude of 
differences in labour costs between the incumbent and subcontractors and temporary agencies. As 
noted in the first section of this report, bargaining coverage in the telecommunications sector differs 
across countries, due to variation in mechanisms to extend agreements. There are similar differences in 
bargaining coverage and extension mechanisms for subcontractors and temporary agencies, as well as 
in minimum terms and conditions in these agreements. For example, in France almost all subcontractors 
and temporary agencies are covered by sectoral agreements – and although pay levels are lower in 
these sectors compared to telecommunications, the high minimum wage in France ensures smaller pay 
differences than are present in other countries. At the same time, cost savings can be substantial, and 
call centre work can be offshored to countries with much lower wage rates. Interviewees at France 
Telecom estimated 0-30% difference in the cost of using subcontractors for technician services, 
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depending on the region; while a union representative estimated that call centre subcontractors in 
France cost 50% less and offshore subcontractors cost 75% less than the FT workforce. In contrast, 
Germany does not have a national minimum wage, and many subcontractors are not covered by 
collective agreements, increasing the potential for cost differentiation within Germany. However, it is 
more difficult to offshore mobile work like call centre jobs due to language constraints. 
This points to the importance of the international mobility of different categories of work. France 
Telecom, AT&T, and BT had greater access to offshored call centre services than the other incumbents, 
due to developed subcontractor sectors in, e.g., Morocco and India. Offshored centres often had 
substantially lower direct costs compared to in-house (interviewees provided estimates ranging from 
30-75%). They also may be viewed negatively by customers, and so their use was limited to certain 
categories of work, such as technical support. 
In all EU member states, there are legal requirements that temporary employees receive similar pay and 
conditions to permanent staff. However, there are different loopholes in these laws. For example, in 
Germany and Denmark, agency staff are covered by separate collective agreements, while Austria and 
Italy historically have had high use of freelancer contracts (particularly by subcontractors) allowing 
further differentiation in pay and conditions. UK law permitted different pay and conditions for agency 
employees in the past, which seems to have encouraged more extensive use of these contracts 
compared to our other cases: in the late 1990s, around 50% of BT’s residential call centre workforce was 
employed on temporary agency contracts. An EU Directive requiring equal treatment of temporary 
agency workers across member states from the end of 2011 has reduced the potential for differentiating 
contracts in all of the incumbent firms in Europe. Interviews suggest this has encouraged management 
in several firms to negotiate agreements converting temporary to permanent positions in areas of high 
use. 
Finally, there is a large degree of strategic choice involved in how employers use these measures. 
Management’s view of what areas constitute ‘core competencies’ or primary sources of strategic 
advantage change over time, sometimes dramatically, and can have a significant impact on the nature 
and extent of externalization. Most interviewees pointed to a period of a few years in the 2000s, during 
which there was a concentrated effort within their organizations to identify core and non-core areas of 
work. This typically contributed to an increase in use of subcontractors or other forms of externalization, 
which was then often partially reversed as employers encountered problems with service quality, found 
they were able to reduce costs of the in-house workforce, or refined their view of what constituted core 
areas of the business.  
The counterpart to these changing management strategies is the evolution in strategies pursued by 
unions and other employee representatives. Unions have agreed to outsourcing in exchange for certain 
protections for core employees. They have also actively campaigned against outsourcing, using a 
combination of public campaigns, demonstrations, or concessions and partnerships on productivity 
improvements in-house aimed at reducing or reversing externalization. This can affect the costs of 
externalizing work, as well as the cost of the in-house workforce relative to subcontractors.  
Comparison 
The above discussion shows that all of the case study firms examined in this study have adopted 
different combinations of these four measures to accomplish broadly similar goals: reducing costs while 
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offering more differentiated products and services in an increasingly competitive market. A first 
question concerns why employers choose one set of measures over another. We began to answer this in 
the discussion of subcontracting and temporary agency strategies. Possibilities for internal 
differentiation of pay and conditions and constraints from national labour market institutions affect cost 
differences between (and relative advantages of) alternative strategies. Decisions concerning the form 
differentiation takes are also influenced by negotiations between employers and employee 
representatives. In all incumbent firms, unions have faced choices to either agree to internal changes in 
pay and terms and conditions or to accept some degree of externalization. In general, we can conclude 
that employers have pursued cost reduction and service differentiation within the constraints of 
different collective bargaining structures; while unions have sought to keep as much work as possible 
under their agreements. The degree to which those agreements are encompassing – covering, for 
example, different employee groups in subcontractors or temporary agencies – affects both employer 
incentives to externalize work as well as union incentives to oppose or cooperate with these measures.  
A second question concerns what impact these measures have had on employees. One way to compare 
outcomes is to look at the proportion of the workforce affected by these measures. Figure 3.3 shows the 
percentage of employees at each company who were moved to a subsidiary and who were moved to a 
new employer through outsourcing or spin-offs between 1995 and 2010, using the benchmark of 1995 
employment. The overall percentage ‘double counts’ employees who were affected by both sets of 
measures (i.e. moved to a subsidiary and then subsequently outsourced). The highest rates are at 
TeliaSonera and Deutsche Telekom; moderately high rates at TDC and Orange Polska; and low rates at 
the other companies. As noted above, Orange Polska did not directly transfer its technician workforce to 
new employers when it subcontracted this work – however, several thousand technicians were made 
redundant at the same time and subsequently went to work for third party firms that contract with their 
former employer.  
Figure 3.3 Estimated % employees affected by subsidiary creation and outsourcing or spin-offs, 1995-
2010  
 
Source: news reports and union survey Note: % affected based on 1995 employment. AT&T figures not available.  
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A second question concerns what impact these measures have had on pay and working conditions 
across different employee groups – including employees who remain within the incumbent and its 
subsidiaries, and employees who are employed external to the incumbent through subcontractors or 
temporary agencies. In this analysis, we do not include O2 Telefónica Czech Republic and Orange Polska, 
as we were not able to access reliable pay figures for either case. 
First, we compare pay levels for technician and call centre jobs – focusing on field technicians and call 
centre employees serving consumer customer segments. We calculate pay in US dollars (USD) based on 
purchasing power parity. Figure 3.4 shows considerable variation in hourly pay rates and pay spread for 
field technicians. This shows three patterns. First, TeliaSonera, A1, France Telecom, and Telecom Italia 
all have compressed pay structures and low to moderate pay levels. Second, Deutsche Telekom, BT and 
AT&T all have high pay spread. All three have typical salary levels that are higher than in the other 
countries (interviews at AT&T suggest most technicians are at the top end of the scale due to high 
tenure), but have a starting salary that is either close to the average or starting salary in the first group. 
Third, TDC is distinctive in having a high and compressed salary, with the highest level of starting pay 
across the case studies. We do not have figures for Orange Polska or O2 Telefónica Czech Republic, as 
they have subcontracted all or most of this work to third parties. TeliaSonera’s figures refer to pay at the 
incumbent’s subcontractors, as all of this work was externalized; however, interviewees reported that 
pay levels and structures are similar to those at TeliaSonera prior to spinning off these jobs.  
Figure 3.4: Comparison of pay levels and spread, field technicians in US Dollars [PPP based] 
 
Source: Collective agreements and management/union surveys Note: New hires at AT&T start above minimum pay 
scale in collective agreements reported here. 
Patterns for call centre employees follow broadly similar patterns, although with typically more 
compressed wages and less pronounced differences within Europe. Figure 3.5 illustrates compressed 
pay at very similar levels for TeliaSonera, A1, France Telecom, and Telecom Italia. Again, Deutsche 
Telekom, BT, and AT&T show higher spread, although with somewhat less differentiation compared to 
field technicians. A1 only has starting and typical salary figures – while BT’s figures do not include call 
centre employees hired under the new lower tier contract negotiated in 2011/2012. TDC again has the 
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highest starting pay, but at a level closer to that of other countries; and with most employees at the 
bottom end of the pay distribution.  
It is interesting to observe that pay structure is similar between technicians and call centre employees – 
although here, too, we see some differences between the incumbents. France Telecom and Telecom 
Italia have almost identical pay levels between the two groups; while the companies with higher internal 
differentiation also have larger differences between employee groups. For example, the typical salary in 
BT call centres is a similar level to starting pay for field technicians; while the typical salary at TDC, 
TeliaSonera, and Deutsche Telekom averages the equivalent of $5 USD less for call centre employees 
compared to field technicians. 
Figure 3.5 Comparison of pay levels and spread, call centres (customer service and sales, consumer 
segment) – USD [PPP based] 
 
Source: Collective agreements and management/union surveys Note: New hires at AT&T start above minimum pay 
scale in collective agreements reported here. 
Another way to compare pay is to look at differences between in-house employees, employees at 
subsidiaries or on ‘second tier’ contracts, and employees at subcontractors. Here, we have the best 
comparative data for consumer call centres. As discussed above, several incumbent firms either 
established new call centre subsidiaries and hired into them, purchased existing subcontractors, or 
moved jobs into new subsidiaries.  
Figure 3.6 compares pay differences between these different groups of call centre employees at TDC, 
Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, Telecom Italia, and TeliaSonera. The figures for Deutsche Telekom compare 
former pay in the T-Com business unit in 2006 to 2011 pay at the call centre subsidiary DTKS to which 
employees were moved in 2007; as well as pay at a major subcontractor that has a collective 
agreement. This shows the largest pattern of inequality between all of our case studies. TDC shows 
some differences between the in-house employees, employees at its subsidiary Call Center Europe, and 
pay at a subcontractor – although, as shown above, TDC does not use subcontractors for call centre 
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work. The case of AT&T shows that the AT&T Southwest contract, with the largest number of call centre 
employees, has wide pay spread but high average pay. Pay is more compressed in new AT&T call centres 
covered by the Internet Services contract, which has similar levels to a major subcontractor. We see the 
highest degree of pay compression at Telecom Italia and TeliaSonera. Telecom Italia has the most similar 
pay between in-house call centre employees and those at its subsidiary, Telecontact; while 
subcontractors can pay substantially less (figures here are calculated based on estimates provided by 
employees at one major subcontractor). In contrast, pay at TeliaSonera is only marginally higher than at 
a major subcontractor. 
Figure 3.6 Comparison of pay levels for call centre workers (customer service and sales, consumer 
segment) in US Dollars -- in-house, subsidiaries, and subcontractors [PPP based] 
 
 Source: Collective agreements and management/union surveys Note: New hires at AT&T Southwest start above 
minimum pay scale in collective agreements reported here. 
The comparison of pay data presented in this section demonstrates clear differences in the degree of 
pay inequality between and within similar professions. This has occurred despite broad similarities in 
employer objectives, with increased differentiation in employment terms and conditions across case 
studies. We can identify four patterns of outcomes, based on the degree of inequality in pay and 
conditions internal to the incumbent’s corporate group and across its network of subcontractors (see 
Figure 3.7):  
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1. Low inequality internal and external to incumbent: TeliaSonera, A1 
2. Low inequality internal to incumbent; moderate to high inequality external to incumbent: 
France Telecom, Telecom Italia 
3. High inequality internal and external to incumbent: TDC, Deutsche Telekom, BT, AT&T 
Figure 3.7 Comparison of degree of inequality in pay and conditions within incumbent firms and 
between the incumbent and its subcontractors 
  
 
Internal inequality (within incumbent) 
  High inequality Low inequality 
 
 
 
External 
inequality 
(between 
incumbent and 
subcontractors) 
 
 
H
ig
h
 in
e
q
u
al
it
y TDC 
Deutsche Telekom 
BT 
AT&T 
 
France Telecom 
Telecom Italia 
Lo
w
 in
e
q
u
al
it
y  
 
 
TeliaSonera 
A1 
 
One explanation for these different patterns is the coverage and structure of collective bargaining at 
firm, industry, and national level. Both TeliaSonera and A1 have encompassing agreements for a range 
of contract types (including temporary agencies and subcontractors), with the strongest enforcement 
mechanisms for those agreements. France Telecom and Telecom Italia both have compressed wage 
structures internal to incumbents, due to collective agreements that are at a comparatively low level for 
all employee groups, and in the case of Telecom Italia, are similar across subsidiaries and internal 
employees. However, subcontractors can have substantially lower pay due to poor union organization 
rates and the broad use of atypical contracts, which are often not covered by collective agreements.  
The remaining firms have both high internal and external inequality. These are all located in countries 
where bargaining coverage is low or non-existent among subcontractors, and where traditionally it has 
been possible to differentiate terms and conditions using temporary agency employees. It appears that 
they also have seen a large wage premium for the incumbent’s workforce – even relative to pay for 
similar groups in other countries. This may help explain why unions have agreed to often large 
differentiation in pay and conditions in-house over the period following market liberalization. 
The comparative findings presented thus far have established the important role that national 
institutions and firm-level collective bargaining structures have played in shaping restructuring 
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strategies in a range of areas, including redundancy and redeployment policies as well as approaches to 
diversifying employment contracts. In the following section we turn to internal policies aimed at 
adjusting to more competitive markets through work reorganization and human resource management.
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Section 4 
Work Organization and Human Resource Management 
The above comparison shows that the case study firms have adopted different models for restructuring 
employment to adjust to changing skill demands, to increase flexibility and productivity, and to reduce 
costs. Another set of employer strategies to meet these objectives has focused on adjusting internal 
employment practices. Technicians and call centre employees have been the target of measures to 
implement new models of work organization, coaching and monitoring practices, variable pay and 
performance evaluation methods, and scheduling approaches. As with the restructuring measures 
discussed above, these internal changes in employment practices have been negotiated with employee 
representatives. Resulting differences can be traced in part to the outcome of these negotiations, as 
well as differences in constraints on strategic choices by past and current collective agreements. 
In this section, we compare current approaches to work organization and human resource management 
across the case study companies, and analyse how changes in these practices have been negotiated with 
employee representatives. We focus on the five incumbent firms where we conducted in-depth 
research – TDC, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, BT, and Orange Polska. The discussion is organized 
around two areas of employment practice:  
 Work organization and skills, including job specialization, training and development activities, 
and use of teams 
 Performance management, including variable pay, performance evaluation, coaching, and 
monitoring 
As discussed in the introduction, we compared work organization and HRM practices across two main 
employee groups: technicians (with a focus on field technicians) and call centre employees (with a focus 
on the consumer segment).  
In our analysis below, we seek to identify broad differences in the HRM strategies incumbent firms have 
adopted in response to similar challenges, as well as to evaluate why they have adopted those practices. 
Researchers often describe two distinct models of work organization and HRM: a high-involvement 
model and more Taylorized or constrained model. High-involvement models emphasize direct forms of 
employee participation, through self-managed teams or offline problem solving, often complemented 
by consultation with employee representatives; as well as investments in training and development of 
broad skills. A Taylorized or constrained model involves centralization of decision-making, accompanied 
by low levels of direct employee control over their work, tight monitoring of effort and results, and a 
more narrow division of labour or de-skilling. A crucial difference is in the tools used to improve 
productivity or performance, with the high-involvement model relying more heavily on employee skills 
and commitment, while the constrained model relies on tight control of effort and results, often with 
targeted incentives attached to performance measures.  
These two models represent ‘ideal types’ – with most employers adopting a combination of practices 
that fall between these extremes. However, we can broadly characterize approaches to work 
organization, training, and performance management as falling closer to one or the other of these ideal 
types. This has implications for job quality, as high-involvement models have been found in past 
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research to be associated with higher job satisfaction and lower stress. However, a large body of 
research has also established that these practices improve productivity and organizational performance, 
through enhancing commitment and investments in human capital. In the discussion below, we 
highlight cases where these mutual gains are most evident. 
1. Work organization and skills 
As incumbents have sought to respond to more differentiated markets, they have faced choices 
concerning how to organize technician and call centre jobs to best meet the needs of diverse customer 
segments; as well as the breadth and content of skills needed for different jobs.  
Technicians are a diverse group, with the major division typically drawn between field technicians and 
network technicians. Field technicians are broadly responsible for installing lines or equipment and 
repairing faults at residential customer and business premises. Network technicians broadly are 
responsible for network construction, maintenance, and repair. However, there is considerable variation 
in how employers organize these different groups of employees, as well as the extent of interaction 
between them. One interviewee from BT explained the problem from management’s perspective in this 
way: 
‘The question mark for the company is that you have a network out there which is fallible and you have 
an engineering workforce, but you also have products which are digital products which are going to be 
fixed within the home. So if you have an engineer, do you want an engineer who is down a hole one 
minute, up a pole the next, and then in a customer’s premises the next, so, i.e., multi-skilled – so do you 
want to skill all your engineers to do all the tasks, which is the best way of doing work distribution? Or do 
you want to have your engineers so that one engineer can do an underground fault and one engineer 
can do an overhead fault and the third engineer can do a digital fault?’ (Interview, BT union 
representative) 
At TDC, technicians responsible for the fixed line consumer segment were divided into two major 
groups: 1) field and operations, responsible for installation; and 2) network and capacity, responsible for 
maintenance, construction, and repair. Among the companies, TDC appeared to have the broadest jobs 
in each area, which had been the result of a progressive merging of specializations: 
‘In the early days, we had a few kinds of technicians… and you had sub-levels doing each kind of 
equipment…. if you went to someone and asked, “please, would you pull a cable from here to there?” 
They would say: “oh no, no, cable pulling, that’s not our job: that’s the dirty work”. But as time went 
along, they were merged, and now the technicians are supposed to do most kinds of work in very many 
different platforms… basically now we have two types of technicians: those who are driving out to the 
customers, and those who are working at the hubs in the stations.’ (Interview, TDC shop steward) 
BT had a similar structure, relying on multi-skilled technicians within the field and network areas. 
Technicians (called ‘engineers’) at BT were largely based in two units: Openreach, responsible for the 
'last mile' after the exchange, and Operate, responsible for the network before the exchanges ('the 
core'). In Openreach, the technicians were split between service delivery, responsible for network 
maintenance and customer installation and service; and network delivery, responsible for network 
construction and maintenance. Employees within each broad group were allocated to jobs based on a 
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‘skill matrix’, a workforce management tool distinguishing different categories of skill and the level of 
competence for each employee.  
At Deutsche Telekom (DT) and France Telecom (FT), technician jobs had become more specialized over 
time. At DT, employees were also divided into two main groups, the field technicians who were based in 
the DT Technischer Service (DTTS) subsidiary; and the network technicians (fixed line and mobile 
network) who were based in the DT Technik subsidiary. In 2007, the field technicians were divided into 
separate groups, one responsible for service and faults and the other for new orders. Employees were 
further specialized on different products in each group – with around 50 different skill areas. However, 
specializations were based on complexity and value-added of products rather than customer types. In 
2009, technicians were further separated into dedicated teams serving residential and small business 
markets.  
There had also been ongoing efforts to create more specialization. Most DT field technicians fell within 
three job categories: Monteur who handled simple connections and product assembly; and Service 
Monteur and Service Techniker who were responsible for more complex connections, maintenance, and 
repair. Around 2002, the Monteur were made responsible for laying and switching on the line, and then 
a Service Techniker installed the computer and attached the router. This provided potential cost savings, 
due to the salary differences between the two groups. However, many employees in the Monteur 
position remained at or were moved onto a higher pay grade, reducing these savings. Works councillors 
observed that there had been ongoing negotiations and at times conflict with management over the 
reclassification of these jobs, which had implications for employee pay and skill.  
At FT, most technicians were located in two administrative units: the Network Control Units (UPR), 
responsible for fixed and mobile network construction and ‘performance optimization’; and the 
Response Units (UI), which included all activities related to customer intervention, network structure 
and local loop, and management of the existing network – in other words, both network and field 
technicians serving business and consumer markets. Response Unit technicians were divided into three 
main skill groups, based on responsibility for residential customers, business customers, or network 
construction and maintenance. Similar to DT, there had been a move toward increased specialization 
over time, which involved separation of tasks that were formerly handled by technicians with a broader 
skill set. However, as detailed in the case study box below, management had implemented a new model 
of multi-skilled teams in many regions, to encourage better coordination between specializations. 
Case study: Multi-skilled teams and investment in training and development at France Telecom 
In the late 2000s, France Telecom invested in multi-skilled teams in its Response Unit. In the past, there 
were separate teams for small business and retail as well as for field operations and dispatching 
activities. In a number of regions, these were brought together into departments and teams that 
included employees from all areas. This was intended to both encourage sharing of knowledge across 
specializations and to improve coordination where different skills were needed to solve a problem. 
These changes were also implemented as a form of job enrichment, as internal research suggested that 
employees were dissatisfied with a model of work organization focused on increasingly narrow 
specializations. One manager described the goals of this initiative: 
‘we are in charge of all the customers and all the activities on a geographic area and we try to develop 
multi-skills so that we can answer the demands of all kinds of customers and operations on networks. 
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One of our big challenges is to develop these multi-skills aspects so that we can improve efficiency, and 
also it is also something that is asked by technical people. They prefer to work for different activities and 
different customers rather than to be specialized in one field of operation.’ (Interview, FT manager) 
The shift to multi-skilled teams also influenced training. New employees were recruited into 
apprenticeships that alternated between classroom and on-the-job training, with increased focus on 
developing a range of skills.  
‘You are not recruited into the job of technician so-and-so, but you are recruited into the profession of 
technician and to your first job in this type of activity, but you will have to necessarily evolve into broader 
activities in the long term…. the general rule which is now understood, it is of course versatility or 
adaptability….’ (Interview, FT manager) 
This was viewed as a successful initiative based on a number of different outcomes. Managers observed 
that the technicians initially resisted working on different activities or with different customers, but 
were increasingly willing to assist each other across specializations. Variation in productivity had 
declined, and ‘global productivity’ had increased. Union representatives and employees generally felt 
that the multi-skilled teams were a positive initiative that gave technicians more professional autonomy 
in their jobs. This was also part of an effort to improve the working environment within France Telecom:  
‘We are really in the process of changing the social contract, the business model. We were following a 
very prescriptive model, very top down; and then there is the model we are building now… where we 
want to improve things, develop versatility, etc. – and at the same time give a little more room for the 
human side, the room for manoeuvre and at the same time accountability…. The modes of operation we 
started to put in place with these team meetings… to share the difficulties in the field and give teams the 
means to deal with the difficulties they see or improve them, these are the means for us to reclaim the 
men and women [of the organization]. And restore their pride, responsibility, the ability to develop in 
their profession. So here we are, in the process of generalizing this everywhere and then bringing it to 
life. Because once we enter into this type of dynamic, we see that people will develop new modes of 
working.’ (Interview, FT manager) 
As the above case study illustrates, work organization and associated skill demands had implications for 
training investments. Traditionally, technicians in all of the incumbent firms completed internal 
apprenticeships, lasting from 2-4 years. There have been similar trends over time across the incumbents 
in a reduction in training investments, due to contraction in demand for technicians and the relatively 
high tenure of the workforce. However, the extent of this contraction varied. TDC stopped offering 
apprenticeships in 2009, and had not been recruiting new technicians in its consumer operations. In 
contrast, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and BT all still offered apprenticeships. Almost all of DT’s 
field technicians had completed apprenticeship training in the Systemelektroniker/in trade, and most 
received their training at DT. A collective agreement with the union committed management to offering 
a certain number of apprenticeship places; however, only a proportion of employees completing the 
apprenticeship did not transition to permanent jobs at DT. In DTTS, for example, one interviewee noted 
that in the past year 14 apprentices had been hired in a region with 1500 field technicians. At BT 
Openreach, in 2012, around 500 apprentices started out of a workforce of around 20,000 engineers, 
most of whom would go on to be offered jobs within BT. In addition, BT recruited a number of 
employees who had received formal graduate-level training outside of BT, including the army. These 
employees would then receive around 16 weeks of training, depending on their skill level. 
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The content of apprenticeships had changed over time. Employee representatives at the three firms 
that still offered apprenticeships expressed concern with increasing specialization in the content of 
training and job placements. For example, at DT, apprentices in the past had spent three years working 
in a wide range of different areas and jobs. By 2011, they were ‘sent exclusively to those areas where 
they are needed’: 
‘I think that when I was an apprentice… I learned a lot of technical skills as well as logical thinking. That 
has helped me throughout my life as a craftsman…. Today it depends on which colleague he [the 
apprentice] is sent to. Then he learns how to install wires, but that also happens under a certain amount 
of time pressure and performance pressure. He learns how to install and repair a connection. It is very 
practical.’ (Interview, DTTS works councillor) 
All of the companies also increasingly sought to integrate formal on-going training with on-the-job 
training, or ‘learning by doing’. At TDC, one technician in a team was often sent to a course, and then 
was responsible for training his or her co-workers. At DT, each employee received a minimum of three 
qualification days a year, but interviewees observed that increasingly most training occurred in 
meetings. At the same time, DT offered a range of voluntary training sessions and workshops that 
employees could attend to upgrade or expand their skill set.  
FT and BT appeared to have made the most extensive investments in formal on-going training. 
Interviewees estimated that BT spent around £100 million per year on training, which was typically 
targeted to the individual and offered in small modules at the workplace or at local training centres. FT 
offered 2-3 day courses on site for particular products; but also had a range of opportunities for 
employees to upgrade their skills to move to higher paid jobs. Employees could change their occupation 
or job within FT through an intense training course called ‘pathways to professionalization’. Employees 
received a bonus during the training, and then could be promoted to a higher paying job, depending on 
the area. They could also receive a certificate called ‘Validation of Experience Acquired’ to recognize 
certain skills they had acquired on-the-job, which could be associated with more pay or responsibilities. 
An HR Director described these promotion and training opportunities as an important source of 
motivation for the technician workforce. 
An additional change in skills we observed across the incumbents was the increased importance of a 
range of soft skills for field technicians, including sales, marketing, and customer service.  
These different approaches to work organization and training had implications for promotion 
opportunities. As noted above, TDC had the fewest specializations, with technicians expected to handle 
a range of skills. This meant there were few promotion opportunities beyond management. At the other 
companies, there were possibilities to move up to a higher paid position through more extensive 
training courses. Table 4.1 summarizes differences in approaches to work organization, training, and 
promotion for field technicians across the cases.  
52 
 
Table 4.1 Work organization and training for field technicians 
 Technician groups Initial training Further training Promotion 
TDC  
Field & 
Operations 
 
- consumer only 
- all EEs in same skill group 
No new 
apprentices 
Most training on the 
job; formal training 
rare 
Few opportunities 
other than 
management 
Deutsche 
Telekom  
DT Technischer 
Service 
- separate groups for 
consumer & small 
business 
- 2 main skill groups: 
connections & 
maintenance/repair 
- Apprenticeship 
3-3 ½ years 
- Minority hired 
after 
completing 
3 training days/year; 
increased on the job 
training 
Promotion through 
formal training 
France 
Telecom 
Response Units  
- multi-skilled teams by 
region bring together EEs 
working for consumer & 
business 
- 3 main skill groups: 
consumer, business, and 
network 
- Apprenticeship 
2-3 years 
- Majority hired 
after 
completing 
2-3 day courses on 
products; more 
extensive courses 
offered to change jobs 
or receive formal 
certification in new 
skills 
Promotion through 
formal training 
BT  
Openreach 
- consumer & business 
together 
- broadly multi-skilled; but 
EEs allocated to jobs based 
on individual skill set 
- Apprenticeship 
2-3 years  
- Majority hired 
after 
completing 
- But most 
recruitment via 
direct adult 
recruitment 
Modular training 
courses on-site or at 
local training centres 
Promotion across 
four titles based on 
seniority and 
qualification 
 
In call centres, the incumbent firms faced similar challenges concerning skill content and specialization. 
Call centre employees can be ‘multi-skilled’, trained to handle a range of call types; or more narrowly 
focused on one kind of calls – for example, billing and collections, outbound sales, or customer service. 
In addition, employees may handle calls from all customers or be organized into separate teams serving 
groups of customers based on their ‘value added’ – for example, small business customers or residential 
customers purchasing a high value bundle of products and services with higher margins. All of the firms 
had separate call centres responsible for large business customers, typically based in a separate business 
unit. However, the extent of specialization based on residential and SME customer groups varied. 
Finally, most incumbents merged their mobile, fixed line, and internet lines of business in the 2000s 
(with the exception of BT, which sold its mobile subsidiary), and faced choices concerning the extent of 
integration between sales and service across the three market segments.  
TDC is a unique case, as it has separately branded subsidiaries that sell discounted products and services 
(e.g. for mobile and internet), with their own call centres. In-house centres based in TDC’s ‘Consumer’ 
unit had four main groups of employees handling sales and service, technical support, billing, and 
outbound sales. Its subsidiary Call Center Europe was organized around these same areas, with the 
exception of outbound sales. BT’s in-house call centres were divided into similar groups: technical 
support and complaints, residential sales and service, SME sales and service, and billing and collections. 
Orange Polska had spun off all of its post-sale customer service activities to a subsidiary, Orange 
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Customer Service, where customer advisors handled a range of billing, technical support, and service-
related calls. Orange Polska also had dedicated outbound centres. 
Both TDC and Orange Polska were distinctive in not having specialized teams dedicated to higher ‘value-
added’ customers, and having predominantly mixed teams responsible for mobile and fixed line 
products and services. At TDC, employees within each group built up skill sets over time – for example, 
in technical support they started with two skill sets; then every month or two got trained on additional 
skills until they developed a complete skill set. However, the assumption was that over time employees 
within each group would be able to handle all calls. BT had some segmentation by customer type (SME 
vs. residential). However, there had been a shift over time toward recruiting and training employees 
into multi-skilled positions, where they were expected to handle a range of call types within each 
segment.  
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom had more complex structures for organizing specializations in 
their call centres. At DT, employees were divided into seven segments: sales and customer retention 
(new or leaving customers), small business, residential service ‘gold’ (lower value), residential service 
‘platinum’ (higher value), home list, technical service, and mobile service. There were also different 
teams of generalists and specialists. ‘Generalists’ were ranked according to their skills and abilities (as 
identified, e.g., by team leaders and sales statistics), and calls were routed to top ranked employees 
first. At FT, employees were organized in two ‘levels’, with multiple specializations within each. Level 1 
received 80% of the calls, and included a matrix of three employee groups (sales and termination, 
customer service and account management, billings and collections) with a further three customer 
segments: gold (high value), standard (low value), and new customers. Level 2 received the remaining 
20% of calls, and included five groups handling complicated collections, customer retention, technical 
assistance, after-sales service, and e-delivery tracking. These two levels were closely integrated, with 
distinct ‘flows’ for collections, sales, and service.  
As discussed above, both firms had separate call centres for mobile and fixed-line markets in the early- 
to mid-2000s, with different pay and conditions. At DT, these employee groups had been moved to the 
DTKS subsidiary, with a similar structure of pay and conditions, and sales were increasingly integrated 
between the two segments. However, customer service for mobile customers continued to be handled 
by a separate team. FT continued to maintain separate call centres (or teams within call centres) for 
fixed line/ internet and mobile customers, which were organized into separate units. However, at 
headquarters level, they were under one manager, and work organization and HR policies had been 
harmonized across both groups of call centres. There was also an attempt to gradually bring these areas 
together, and at three of FT’s call centres, employees could service all three segments. One manager 
noted that this required an ‘extremely intense and extremely long’ training course to enable employees 
to answer calls relating to a wide range of products and services.  
Table 4.2 summarizes the different models the case study firms adopted concerning specialization. 
Similar to technicians, TDC and BT had the most ‘multi-skilled’ approach to work organization, joined by 
Orange Polska. The other companies had developed different strategies to differentiate between 
customer groups and call types, often adopting mixed models or experiments to merge different areas 
of work or cross-sell products across groups. 
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Table 4.2 Work organization and training for call centres (residential market) 
 Call centre specializations Initial training  Turnover and 
tenure 
Absenteeism 
TDC 
1) Consumer 
2) Call Center 
Europe 
(subsidiary) 
- sales & service, technical support, 
billing, outbound sales (1 only) 
- mixed mobile & fixed line teams 
- no specialization by customer group 
1) 5-6 weeks 
2) 4-5 weeks 
1) N/A 
2) 6% quits; 74% 
> 3 yrs tenure 
1) 3.5-4% 
2) 6% 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
DT Kundenservice 
new sales & customer retention; 
small business; residential service 
‘gold’ (low value); residential service 
‘platinum’ (high value); home list; 
technical support; mobile service 
Apprenticeship 2 
years; 6 weeks 
initial training 
15% quits; av. 
tenure > 20 yrs 
8-10% 
France Telecom 
AVSC unit (fixed & 
internet) and 
CCOR unit 
(mobile) 
- Level 1 (80% calls): sales & 
termination, customer service & 
account management, billings & 
collections – 3 customer segments: 
gold (high value), standard (low 
value), and new customers. 
- Level 2 (20% calls): complicated 
collections, customer retention, 
technical assistance, after-sales 
service, e-delivery tracking 
- 20% employees ‘multi-skilled’ to 
handle 2+ call type 
- separate mobile & fixed line/ 
internet centres; 3 mixed centres 
handle both 
- 6 weeks if 
customer service 
background 
- 12 weeks if 
changing jobs 
within France 
Telecom 
2% retirement, 
marginal quits 
6-10% 
BT 
BT Retail 
Technical support and complaints, 
residential sales and service, SME 
sales and service, billing and 
collections  
4-6 weeks 10-50%; av. 
tenure 15-20 yrs 
4-5% 
Orange Polska 
Orange Customer 
Service 
Limited specializations: multi-skilled 
agents handle in-bound billing, sales, 
service for mobile and fixed-line 
customers; dedicated outbound 
sales centres 
2-3 months Significant drop in 
recent years 
(from 60%); 
higher in sales 
<10% 
 
This comparison demonstrates that there is no clear ‘best practice’ concerning the degree of 
specialization or breadth of skills that was universally adopted across call centres. In interviews, 
managers and employee representatives at most companies described change over time both toward 
and away from a model of work organization relying on more broadly skilled employees. Customers 
typically preferred having agents who could answer a range of questions, without having to be routed 
across agents. In addition, broadly skilled employees who could handle multiple calls provided a high 
degree of internal flexibility, allowing management to route calls when demand peaked in different 
areas. However, this model required a relatively high level of skill and made it more difficult to compare 
performance at the individual level. Thus, as companies adopt more intensive monitoring and 
individualized targets, specialization is increasingly attractive.  
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2. Performance Management 
Performance management can be broadly defined as the set of practices and policies an organization 
uses to motivate its employees, including goal-setting, coaching and feedback practices, performance 
monitoring, and rewards, such as variable pay. Here we start with a detailed comparison of performance 
management in call centres, followed by a summary of practices in technician workplaces.  
Across the call centres, we observed a similar trend toward increased centralization and standardization 
of performance management practices. Employees were expected to meet targets in similar areas, 
including call handling time, ‘compliance’ with schedules, customer service, and sales; and performance 
was evaluated using a combination of individual- and team-based metrics, remote monitoring, and side-
by-side listening with coaches.  
At BT, 90% of calls were recorded, and each advisor was coached at least once a week (often through 
listening to these calls). At TDC, all calls were recorded, metrics were closely tracked, and team leaders 
conducted daily side-by-side coaching sessions. Employees also met with their team leader every three 
weeks to discuss overall performance and absenteeism. Orange Polska had one of the most ‘light touch’ 
approaches to monitoring: a proportion of calls were recorded, and supervisors listened to at least three 
calls from the same employee every month and decided on this basis whether she needed additional 
training. 
France Telecom had the most developed coaching and training system. Team leaders or ‘managers’ 
were responsible for teams of 12-15 customer advisors. The team leader’s role was to listen to calls, do 
a ‘debriefing’ and re-listen to calls after a call was completed to identify areas of improvement for a 
customer advisor. Each employee then also had a dedicated trainer, or ‘professional support’ person – 
with one trainer for each 18 customer advisors. The trainer was responsible for the 6-12 weeks initial 
training, and then organized individual training and support for each advisor. The team leader met with 
the trainer regularly to develop a work plan to help the customer advisor progress:  
‘So, there is a tacit agreement between the manager, the trainer, and the customer advisor, saying, in 
this area, you are not at the expected level, so we are going to put in place help or a personalized course, 
we’ll put in place everything you can imagine, to be able to help you improve.’ (Interview, FT CC 
manager) 
‘It’s very important to say that the recording tools [remote call recording] should be mainly used to make 
the customer advisor progress, always in a dynamic of progress; otherwise, that doesn’t work…. That is 
also a question of management maturity – that is to say to ensure that managers put themselves in a 
position where they are supporting customer advisors, that’s difficult. It is easier for a manager to look at 
the spreadsheet with the results, to go to the customer advisor to ask him why he didn’t have these 
results, which isn’t what should be done – which is to do his real work consisting of making the advisor 
want to be better and to progress through giving him the tools to be able to get there.’ (Interview, FT 
manager) 
At Deutsche Telekom, there had been change over time in coaching and monitoring practices. In the 
past, a collective agreement with the works council prohibited remote electronic monitoring. However, 
by the late 2000s, a new monitoring system called ‘Intelligent Routing & Reporting Platform’ had been 
adopted that allowed calls to be recorded for the first time. Team leaders could look at a sample of calls 
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and ‘screen shots’, captured by a system that recorded both in certain intervals. Based on this 
information, they would develop training plans with employees. 
The above comparison shows broad similarities in approaches to monitoring and coaching by the firms. 
The main differences we observed were in two areas: first, how performance information was used, 
particularly in the presence of a disciplinary procedure that could lead to dismissal; and second, the 
design of variable pay practices.  
At BT, TDC, and Orange Polska, employees who failed to meet performance metrics could go through a 
disciplinary procedure that led to dismissal. This was possible because of weaker employment 
protections and the lack of civil servants with iron-clad job security. At BT, employees had targets with a 
weighting that changed monthly. These weightings factored into an overall performance indicator. A 
traffic light system then indicated whether an individual was green, amber, or red. If an employee was 
‘red’ for three weeks, she was placed on an informal coaching plan. If she did not improve, a 
performance case was raised and she was put on a ‘performance plan’. The whole process from initial 
formal warning to a final warning and decision took about ten weeks, and the employee could appeal at 
every stage (often with union support).  
TDC’s call centres also had procedures in place to dismiss employees, although these typically operated 
through voluntary redundancy plans. Managers and union representatives observed that employees 
with consistently poor performance or who were often absent were encouraged to take voluntary 
redundancy, as the terms were more generous compared to dismissal. At Orange Polska, supervisors 
would identify weaknesses and agree a plan with the employee to solve these by a certain date. Failure 
to improve could lead to a warning, reprimand, disciplinary action, and then dismissal. However, one 
supervisor at Orange Polska observed that their system of monitoring was ‘light touch’ and not typically 
used for disciplinary purposes. At all three companies, dismissal on performance grounds was rare, and 
significant resources were invested in improving performance through training and development. 
However, the presence of this potential threat of dismissal was an important tool used to motivate 
employees to improve in target areas.  
At Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, it was more difficult to dismiss employees for poor 
performance, due to collective agreements and works council oversight (DT) or employment protection 
rules and a high proportion of civil servants (FT). There were some ways around this. For example, one 
supervisor at DT observed that if an employee did not improve after going through training, then there 
would sometimes be a discussion with the employee concerning ‘whether they really think that this is 
the right job for them.’ However, generally this restriction encouraged management to develop 
alternative strategies for motivating employees. At FT, employees received regular performance 
evaluations, and the results were used to determine salary increases or promotions: 
‘There is nothing, there aren’t any sanctions, we have to try to make them improve as much as possible 
anyway. Of course, we have annual meetings – and there we evaluate the level [of performance]. If that 
is insufficient, that could be an obstacle if someone wants to do another job or to get a promotion. So 
there are consequences [for poor performance].’ (Interview, FT CC team manager) 
Even where managers could dismiss employees, it was only one among a range of performance 
management tools. For example, several interviewees stressed the importance of small competitions 
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and prizes – particularly for younger employees. A team leader at TDC described these as central to her 
strategy:  
‘When I’m training them I’m talking a lot about motivation. I ask them, “what motivates you?” And they 
come with, “Oh I want to make my goals,” they can see all their numbers, their own numbers. So they can 
promote a happiness… Every time they make a sale they are clinging on a clock, and then we’ll all clap 
and there’ll be a celebration. Today they are having a Competition [to win theatre tickets]. It’s a happy 
hour today. So we’re having small tools to give some more. Sometimes they get a diploma, sometimes it’s 
only the clapping but green numbers and good words.’ (Interview, TDC CC team leader) 
Variable pay systems were present in different forms across the companies. The main differences 
concerned: a) whether incentives were primarily sales-based commissions, or attached to meeting 
targets in different areas (e.g. customer service, call length); b) the unit at which performance was 
measured (organization, team, or individual); c) whether variable incentives were added on top of base 
pay or integrated into base pay (i.e. it was necessary to meet targets in order to receive full base pay).  
BT and France Telecom both had a model of variable pay that was primarily based on sales-based 
commissions on top of base pay. Thus, both only had variable pay for employees involved in sales. This 
was due in large part to long-standing union resistance at both companies to performance-related pay: 
sales commissions were viewed as more acceptable, as they were easy to measure and provided 
employees the possibility of earning substantially above their base pay.  
At BT, sales bonuses were paid based on sales targets. If employees hit 85% or more of their targets, 
they were eligible to receive a monthly bonus. If they hit over 105%, they received an ‘Accelerator’ for 
the quarter. In one call centre taking inbound calls to sell to SMEs, for example, this would amount to 
£2,500-3,000 a quarter. If they hit over 116% in all areas, it would be £3,400 or £3,600. If they hit 126% 
or more in all areas, this would be £4,000 plus their standard commission on bonus as well. The 
standard commission on bonus was 35% on OTE, so over three months, this would be between £1,600 
and £1,800 depending on the base wage. One manager described how this could affect the salaries of 
employees with the highest sales: 
‘our top guy here at the moment who consistently hits Accelerator... over a quarter, his base bonus 
would be something like £1,800 plus the Accelerator he’s getting is £5,800 in total, and then plus his 
wages every month... he’ll probably be looking about between £45,000-£50,000 a year.’ (Interview, BT 
CC manager). 
Conversely, employees who met 85% of targets or under would receive something closer to their base 
wage, in this case about £20,000 a year. Those who consistently did not achieve 85% would receive 
additional coaching under a performance plan, leading to improvement or dismissal.  
At France Telecom, 40% of call centre employees were in sales jobs that were eligible for variable pay. 
However, unlike at BT, variable pay for this group was calculated based on a range of metrics: sales in 
relation to sales objectives in certain product areas; multiplied by a coefficient based on service quality; 
multiplied by a coefficient based on performance (e.g. number of calls handled per hour). Sales were 
divided into 10 families of products. In order to get variable pay, it was necessary to reach at least 70% 
of the objectives in each of the 10 families. However, if customer satisfaction was low, then sales would 
be multiplied by ‘0’. This complicated system was designed to avoid encouraging employees to prioritize 
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one area at the expense of the others – although managers admitted that it was difficult to design good 
measures for service quality:  
‘This variable system is sophisticated enough to try to avoid a situation where the customer advisors 
aren’t focusing on one objective to the detriment of others. On the other hand, it’s true that whatever 
isn’t in the variable pay system can be a little forgotten, and often that which isn’t in the variable pay 
system contributes to quality.’ (Interview, FT manager) 
Most of these coefficients were measured at the individual level, with the exception of the number of 
calls taken per hour, which was measured at the team level. A manager in headquarters estimated the 
average variable pay for a sales employee was between €200-300 per month – but could go up to 
€1,000 per month.  
The other three firms had variable pay for all call centre employees, which was based on meeting 
different goals. At Orange Polska, employees received around a 10-15% bonus on top of base pay if they 
fulfilled all or most of their goals. This consisted of around 20% ‘global targets’ in areas like customer 
satisfaction; and 80% individual targets. At TDC’s in-house centres, employees also typically received 
around 10% performance-based pay on top of their base salary. The largest component of variable pay 
for most groups in the call centres (particularly sales and service) was individual-based sales 
commission. The union had successfully argued for aggregating other performance metrics at the team 
level, which were tied to a team-based bonus. The resulting model based incentives on around 60% 
individual sales performance and 40% team performance on other metrics. At TDC’s subsidiary Call 
Center Europe, bonuses varied across client accounts and products sold within those accounts. 
However, a typical structure had individual targets with similar weightings for sales, ‘recall’, and 
efficiency; and team targets based on customer satisfaction scores. The top 20% of every team then 
could receive an additional ‘top bonus’ – which was also dependent on reaching 90% schedule 
compliance. The maximum bonus was 15.5 Kroner per hour, if an employee met all of their parameters 
(around 12% of salary); and a typical bonus, based on meeting all basic individual and team targets, was 
9.50 Kroner/hour, or around 7.5% of salary. In addition, management had recently introduced a new 
initiative called ‘celebrate our successes’, in which each team leader nominated the best employee in 
each team every quarter to receive an additional 2,000 Kroner bonus. 
Deutsche Telekom’s variable pay system was distinctive among the case study firms in several ways. 
First, it was the only case where fulfilment of targets was a requirement for receiving 100% base pay. 
Second, it was the only case where a proportion of targets were based on company performance. This 
model had been adopted in 2007, although elements of it had been adapted from DT’s former T-Mobile 
call centres. Employee representatives had sought to build in various protections to this model over 
time, and the amount and terms of ‘pay at risk’ had been an important issue in collective bargaining. We 
describe the details of the variable pay system in the case study box below.  
Case study: Negotiating protections into performance management at Deutsche Telekom 
Deutsche Telekom’s call centres went through a number of organizational changes, which were also 
associated with significant changes in performance management. In 2007, DT’s call centres from its T-
Com and T-Mobile business units were moved into a new subsidiary, Deutsche Telekom Kundenservice 
(DTKS). 
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The new collective agreement at DTKS introduced 20% variable pay for the majority of former T-Com 
employees, in which 80% of salary was fixed and 20% was dependent on meeting goals in different 
areas. By 2012, 13% of this was based on team performance and 7% on DT or DTKS performance. One 
segment - 'sales and customer retention' - had 30% variable pay, with all or almost all of this based on 
individual performance and no company goals. Many of these employees were new or had been 
transferred from T-Mobile. 
This new model of variable pay was controversial, as employees could receive less than their base pay if 
they did not meet goals. However, the works council and union negotiated an agreement putting in 
place procedures to ensure employee participation in setting and revising the goals:  
‘When this [variable component of pay] was introduced in 2007, with the new service companies, certain 
protections were agreed. We were able to get protections in our negotiations, because we were able to 
say that this is new for employees. They have to understand this first and determine what they need to 
do and what this means for them. So in the first two years, very good protections were negotiated – so 
that regardless of how complicated the system was, employees could be sure that they would still get 
their fixed pay.’ (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 28/9/10). 
A system of local joint committees and a central joint committee were made responsible for ensuring 
the fairness of goals. Employees were given quarterly goals in their teams based on 5 areas with 
different weights, between 15-30% each. The team leader first discussed the goals with the team. If 2/3 
of team members agreed they couldn’t reach the goals, then they were able to make a formal appeal, 
and this would be brought to a local joint committee. If a majority of team members agreed with the 
goals, then they would get information every quarter on where they stood in relation to each goal. 
Employees were also able to contest the way the goals were calculated after the 2nd or 4th quarter – for 
example, to say they could not meet these goals because the IT-system broke down or products were 
not sellable. In addition, company goals were set by the advisory board, which included employee and 
management representatives.  
Despite these protections, union and works council representatives were concerned that employees 
were coming under increased pressure, with the lowest paid groups often facing the largest risks due to 
their high representation in sales positions. In 2012 negotiations, the 70/30 variable pay split was 
eliminated, and so 80% of base pay was secured for all groups.  
The system of setting goals was also modified for employees who were not involved in sales across DT. 
From 2013, this group would be evaluated based on the ‘six most important goals’ or the ‘Big Six’. This 
was in response to concerns that employees were not able to influence all of the different goals they 
were given. The new model was overseen and approved by the advisory board at the beginning and end 
of the year. Employees in this group were also assured that they would get above 90-96% of their base 
pay, depending on the function of the teams. In 2012, one works councillor reported that all teams with 
the ‘Big Six’ goals got at least 108% of their base pay. 
The case study above illustrates the role that unions and works councils have played in negotiating over 
the design and implementation of variable pay models. Orange Polska and TDC also had joint 
committees in place that allowed employee representatives to participate in setting and evaluating 
targets in these plans. At Orange Polska, if targets were regarded by the employee as impossible to fulfil, 
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then the employee could appeal with union support. At TDC’s in-house centres and at Call Center 
Europe, shop stewards and management discussed the variable pay system at monthly meetings. In the 
in-house centres, they had succeeded in arguing for a larger component of team-based variable pay, as 
well as increasing the level of commission attached to fixed line products; while at Call Center Europe 
they successfully argued for a change in the bonus system that provided additional compensation for 
employees who did coaching and training. A shop steward from Call Center Europe felt the union had 
helped to ensure that the bonus system was fair and transparent: 
‘We have meetings every month, where we discuss any changes to the parameters, and if they have we 
discuss if they’re fair. We have an agreement where everything about our bonus, how if changes come 
along what do we do. We have all kinds of details written down in this agreement, how to handle all this. 
Also this agreement defines how this bonus should be managed. You cannot make any changes that you 
just like, it should be a fair and meaningful change to the employee and for the company here, and also 
to the customer.… We have had a lot of work defining this agreement with the bonus; and how it’s 
describing the parameters; and when the parameters change, how quickly can they change; and what’s 
important for the development of the bonus system.’ (Interview, Call Center Europe shop steward). 
Table 4.3 summarizes the differences in variable pay systems described above. 
Table 4.3 Variable pay in call centres 
 
% 
variable 
pay 
Form Performance-based pay structure 
Union/ works council 
involvement 
TDC 
1) Consumer 
2) Call Center 
Europe  
1) 8-10% 
2) 7.5 
-12% 
Above 
base pay 
1) Individual (60%); team (40%) 
2) Individual (63-77%); team (23-37%) 
Joint committees met 
monthly to discuss variable 
pay 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
DT Kundenservice 
 
20-30% 
Included 
in base 
pay 
Individual/team (2/3) + company 
goals (1/3) = 20% 
Sales: Individual/team = 30% 
Collective agreements with 
protections; Joint 
committees reviewed 
appeals on targets 
France Telecom 
1) AVSC unit (fixed 
& internet) 
2) CCOR unit 
(mobile) 
10-15% 
sales 
only 
Above 
base pay 
Sales (individual) X service quality 
(individual) X number of calls/hour 
(team) 
Union opposition meant 
variable pay allowed for 
sales only 
BT 
BT Retail 
35% 
sales 
only 
Above 
base pay 
Exclusively based on individual sales Union opposition meant 
variable pay allowed for 
sales only 
Orange Polska 
Orange Customer 
Service 
10-15% Above 
base pay 
20% ‘global targets’; 80% individual 
targets 
Union supported employee 
appeals on targets 
 
The design of performance management practices for technicians faced similar challenges to call 
centres. Employers were seeking to improve global productivity and customer service. However, the 
nature of the work made it more difficult to monitor and benchmark performance. Skill levels are 
typically high, jobs can vary substantially between customers or assignments, and employees carry out 
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much of their work alone or in small teams. All of the case study firms had put in place more formal 
systems of performance evaluation for this group than existed in the past, and had attempted to 
improve productivity through defining targets (i.e. for increasing the number of customers served per 
day or reducing call-backs). As with call centres, differences concerned the extent to which individual 
performance results were connected to consequences or rewards. Another difference for this group 
concerned monitoring methods, particularly how and whether GPS tracking was applied.  
Performance reviews were an increasingly important tool for comparing and motivating technicians. 
Again, a major difference was in how information from the reviews was used – or what consequences or 
rewards were attached to results. All TDC employees had an annual ‘development conversation’ with 
their supervisor or line manager, focused on identifying training needs and discussing strategies to 
improve performance. Employees also were all supposed to have an individual review once a month. If 
employees did not improve their performance within three to four months, they were placed in a 
‘disciplinary process.’ If they did not show improvement, they would be a likely candidate for 
redundancy. As with call centre employees, low performers were typically encouraged to take voluntary 
redundancy, but could be dismissed if they refused. Management was also implementing a ‘lean’ model 
of continuous improvement that involved frequent meetings in the network operations area. There had 
also been an increase in targets for customers per day in the field technician area, which had increased 
from four to five and was due to go up to six in 2013. 
At BT, performance management only began to be pushed in Openreach since the mid-2000s. Its 
introduction was a culture shock to many. According to one manager, the purpose of performance 
management could have been explained better because '…in parts of the business, and certainly in parts 
of Openreach, we have created a worry around performance management that people are about to get 
sacked.' (Interview, BT Openreach manager). 
Field technicians were assessed on four criteria: 1. the number of jobs they perform, 2. repeat faults, 3. 
health and safety, and 4. customer satisfaction. On the first, the system split the types of jobs into 
different categories, and calculated from historical two-year averages how long each job should take. If 
an engineer took much longer than the average allocated time, there needed to be an explanation 
included in their report at the end of the day. The engineers were monitored constantly, as their 
vehicles were equipped with a tracking device and their work was monitored via their laptop that fed 
into the work manager system, which tracked and downloaded everything they did. If an engineer had 
not finished a job on time, the system would send him an alert.  
If an engineer consistently did not meet his targets, the first-line manager was sent a request to act. The 
first-line manager first tried to find out if the engineer had a personal problem. The data also permitted 
first-line managers to identify types of work at which their engineers struggled, and they could then 
allocate a coach who would go out with the engineers. Engineers had a six-week period to improve. If 
performance did not improve, the performance plan ended in dismissal. However, this happened very 
rarely. In 2010, dismissals through performance amounted to less than 0.1% of the Openreach 
workforce. Even if there were no particular problems, Operations Managers (OMs) were expected to 
draw up coaching plans for all of their teams to identify technical needs, training needs, support needs, 
and other forms of assistance such as job shadowing, a course, or mentoring. 
At France Telecom, employees also met with their supervisors for regular performance reviews – but 
unlike TDC and BT, there were no direct consequences associated with the results of these reviews. 
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Instead, results would be used for determining promotions or salary increases, as with FT’s call centres. 
Management observed that their strategy to improve performance was based on three sets of 
measures: 1) global efficiency improvements, through investing in new technologies, improving 
workstations, and eliminating unnecessary activities; 2) improving the skill and productivity of the 
technician workforce through training investments; and 3) setting increasingly ambitious goals centrally 
(e.g. for productivity, quality, and turnover) attached to incentives for local or regional managers – but 
also combined with organized knowledge sharing across regions. At the local or team level, 
management sought to motivate employees based on work redesign and encouraging learning within 
teams, based on regular meetings oriented around sharing best practices and knowledge. Team 
challenges or competitions also allowed the best performers or individual performers to receive an extra 
bonus. France Telecom had also recently put in place a global performance improvement programme 
called ‘the learning company’, focused on organizing support for employees who encountered problems 
in the course of performing their jobs. This was started in 2010 and was intensified in 2011 and 2012. 
Two major targets for performance improvement were to identify and resolve the source of technical 
faults more quickly; and to improve customer satisfaction. Satisfaction was measured through surveys, 
and calculated as a ‘net promoteur score’ (NPS). One HR director observed that the field technicians 
were motivated to provide a good service to customers, rooted in a strong civil service culture, and so 
took the NPS very seriously. It was measured at the level of teams and the region: ‘In fact, the teams 
know very well where they are vis-à-vis their customers, and whether customer satisfaction is 
improving. And that is a real motivation’ (Interview, FT manager). 
At Deutsche Telekom, performance evaluations were connected with variable incentives. DT was the 
only case study where variable pay was used for technicians. Variable pay was introduced in 2008, after 
the creation of the T-Service subsidiaries. From 2008, technicians at DTTS had 85% fixed salary and 15% 
variable pay, based on goals in different areas. This was broken down into 5% DT group-wide goals (that 
DT meets EBITDA), 5% DTTS goals, and 5% individual or team goals. To achieve an employee’s full salary, 
it was thus necessary to hit goals in each area. This was a similar model to the call centres, although with 
a smaller proportion of individual or team goals. 
Also similar to the call centres, collective agreements built in some protections for this model. 
Performance measures and individual goals had to be agreed at the local level. A works councillor 
observed that there was not much objection to the new system, as employees could earn more with 
variable pay. Individual goals could be changed to team goals, but this had to be decided at the local 
level. The decision to put in place more individual or team-based goals depended on the structure of 
jobs: for field technicians, almost all were team goals. Targets were defined at DTTS level and then 
cascaded down. If a team was consistently not hitting its targets, the reasons for this were investigated, 
and special circumstances were taken into account when calculating variable pay. 
In 2011, a works councillor described how the system had developed. Team goals continued to be the 
focus of the 5% individual/team performance goals. Technicians usually got 3-5 goals worth 20-40% of 
the total goal, including, for example, 80-85% of appointments attended on time; generating a certain 
amount of sales; and % call-backs (typically a goal of 7-8%). Not all teams and employees had the same 
targets because these depended on the areas. For each target, a range was defined, from 0% to 100% 
target fulfilment, and the maximum was defined at 150%. Typically, team leaders would get a certain 
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goal, and then they would try to negotiate with their team how the team as a whole would meet these 
goals. 
As in the call centre area, there was a parity commission with employee and management 
representatives providing oversight. If employees did not agree with goals, they first would try to 
negotiate this with the team leader; and if they couldn’t resolve things at this level, they would bring 
this to the commission and explain the reasons why they could not reach the goals. However, this 
process was very rarely used. 
As noted, Deutsche Telekom was the only case study with variable pay for the technician workforce. 
Both TDC and France Telecom had considered different variable pay models for this group, but had 
concluded they were too difficult to implement. A manager at TDC observed that it was difficult to 
identify the appropriate outcomes to measure and compensate: 
‘we tried to have a kind of results oriented payment we called it; I mean, if you make this result as a 
team, you can have this. But we didn't really succeed in it… In the technician area. No, it's much… 
somehow easier in the call centre area, because you have those very easy measurable KPIs. It's much 
more difficult: how long should it take to install a TV, how long should it take to do this and that, and 
when you go and correct a fault, you know. So it's been very difficult here.’ (Interview, TDC manager) 
A manager at France Telecom noted that they had not attempted to introduce variable pay both 
because of union opposition and because individual forms of pay were seen as at odds with the strong 
collective professional identity of the technician workforce: 
‘The unions are very resistant and very opposed to all this [discussions about introducing variable pay], 
because they fear an opening up of competition between people…. And it is true that in the profession of 
technicians, in the sociological sense of the term, there is a real community of technicians, this is a real 
common culture, and the fear of the unions is that they will lose some influence vis-à-vis technicians. And 
more crucially, it is also harming this profession, in the sense of losing this collective thing. So I am 
extremely attentive to that which keeps the professional side collective, mutual; and at the same time, 
we need to get to a point where we can individually encourage those who want to go faster, farther, etc.’ 
(Interview, FT manager) 
Another difference between the cases was in the use of GPS monitoring. At BT and FT, GPS information 
could be used to track individuals. At BT, union representatives had come to accept the use of GPS, 
which was primarily used to plan efficient routes and work allocation. However, it was still viewed 
critically, as information had been used for supporting disciplinary cases against individuals, though only 
on few occasions. 
At TDC, GPS monitoring of technicians had been in place since 2007. Initially, it was used to track 
individuals in their cars; however, the technicians experienced this as a form of direct control over their 
work. The union succeeded in negotiating an agreement that management could gather GPS data and 
use it to analyze patterns and improve overall efficiency, but would not be able to track or discipline 
individuals. Deutsche Telekom also introduced GPS tracking systems in 2007, and began to discuss with 
its works councils the possibility of using this technology to monitor the movements of individual 
technicians, resulting in a limited pilot project. However, by 2010, DTTS still did not have individual GPS 
monitoring, which management attributed to union and works council resistance.  
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Table 4.4 summarises differences in performance management practices across field technicians in the 
incumbent firms. As described above, major differences concerned the consequences or incentives 
attached to performance evaluations, as well as monitoring practices – particularly the use of GPS data. 
TDC and BT both had progressive discipline policies that could lead to dismissal. France Telecom and 
Deutsche Telekom had in place other systems to motivate technicians. DT relied on variable incentives 
while FT used performance evaluations that were tied to promotion and pay increases.  
Table 4.4 Performance management in field technician workplaces 
 Consequences or 
incentives for 
performance  
Variable pay GPS monitoring 
TDC  
Field & 
Operations 
 
Dismissal No variable pay Yes, but data can’t 
be used to track 
individuals 
Deutsche 
Telekom  
DT Technischer 
Service 
Reduction in variable 
pay 
15% overall: 5% DT performance; 
5% subsidiary performance; 5% 
individual/team performance 
No 
France 
Telecom 
Response Units  
Reduced opportunities 
for promotion or pay 
increase 
No variable pay Yes 
BT  
Openreach 
Dismissal No variable pay Yes 
 
Comparison 
The above discussion shows that similar incumbent telecommunications firms adopted very different 
policies in the areas of work organization, training, and performance management. At the beginning of 
this section, we described two distinct employment ‘models’: a high involvement model and a 
Taylorized or control model. One question concerns how the different case studies compare to these 
ideal types. Broadly, we can say that France Telecom’s approach to work redesign and performance 
management in its technician units most closely approached a high involvement model. This model was 
adopted in the context of the conflict that occurred over restructuring between 2006 and 2008, and the 
commitment of management, together with some unions, to develop alternative management 
approaches that improved employee health and well-being while encouraging performance 
improvements through investments in employee skill and commitment.  
Deutsche Telekom’s call centres had in place a high involvement model before the creation of its DT 
Kundenservice subsidiary in 2007 (see Doellgast 2012). Management practices at its call centres were 
coming to resemble those at the other incumbent firms, with increasing specialization, more intensive 
performance monitoring, and growing use of variable pay. However, works councils used their strong 
participation rights to place limits on how monitoring information was used and to ensure employee 
input into the design and evaluation of the variable pay system. 
Across the incumbent firms, we find that unions and works councils played an important role in building 
safeguards for employees into practices in different areas, with a particularly large role in the area of 
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performance management. Union agreements ensured that variable pay practices, where they were in 
place, were broadly viewed as fair by employees – in some cases based on oversight by joint parity 
committees. Again, Deutsche Telekom, which had the most developed variable pay system, also had the 
most intricate system of employee oversight and negotiated protections.  
One conclusion we can draw is that there is no one emergent ‘best practice’ for work organization and 
HRM models in these call centre and technician jobs. The models we observed at the incumbent firms 
were the result of negotiated compromises with employee representatives, or management strategies 
developed in areas where unions and works councils did not have a clear bargaining role or rights. There 
is evidence that a more ‘high involvement’ model associated with mutual gains for employees and 
employers is possible for highly skilled technician jobs and more transactional call centre jobs. In the 
organizational settings studied here, this appears to require high labour-management trust and long-
term investments in employee skills and commitment. 
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Conclusions and policy implications  
This study has analysed the restructuring strategies adopted by ten incumbent telecommunications 
firms based in countries with distinctive collective bargaining and labour market institutions. 
Incumbents continue to represent the largest share of telecommunications employment in most 
countries – particularly when including externalized employees working for subcontractors and 
temporary agencies. Findings from these firms thus give a good picture of how employment conditions 
in the industry are being re-shaped by recent trends in markets, regulation, and ownership. In this 
section, we summarize our main findings and discuss implications for public policy and management 
practice.  
The research findings demonstrate similarities across the case study firms in a number of areas: 
 In all countries, changes in markets and ownership were associated with pressures for reducing costs 
and responding to differentiated markets, while changing technologies led to shifting skill demands. 
These trends encouraged restructuring measures at all firms aimed at downsizing employment, 
concentrating jobs in fewer locations, redeploying employees to areas of growing demand, 
externalizing jobs, changing employment contracts for certain employee groups, and adopting new 
models of work organization and performance management. 
 All firms have developed strategic responses that involved close cooperation with employee 
representatives in some areas or during certain time periods. However, there has been increased 
labour conflict at most of the case studies, typically associated with measures that seek cost savings 
on pay, terms and conditions of employment, or past redundancy packages. 
 Diversification of contracts through two-tier agreements, subsidiary creation or purchase, employee 
transfer to new companies, and use of subcontracting and temporary agencies has increased 
inequality in pay and conditions within incumbent firms and between their internal and 
subcontracted or temporary agency workforce. These trends have been associated with declining job 
quality for some groups of service employees across incumbents’ production chains.  
 Employee representatives at most of the case studies have sought to partner with management to 
design and implement ‘high involvement’ management practices that invest in employee skills, 
provide some job and pay security, and focus on developing rather than disciplining employees. 
However, they have had uneven success in promoting these practices. 
While there were broad similarities in pressures to restructure employment, the case study firms also 
adopted different policies and practices in a number of areas. We can identify ‘best practices’ from each 
area of management strategy covered in this study, which produced mutual gains for employers and 
employees through adjusting workforce skills and improving performance while preserving or enhancing 
job quality: 
 Downsizing and employment adjustment: Mutual gains were strongest where downsizing policies 
involved labour-management cooperation over employment adjustment, investing in employee skills 
to transfer internally to areas of job growth while offering targeted incentives for voluntary 
redundancy. Examples of ‘best practices’ include retraining and redeployment policies at TeliaSonera 
and BT. In some cases, decisions on redundancy policies were made with little or superficial 
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consultation and investments in training or redundancy plans were reduced significantly in the 
context of strong economic performance. These strategies often resulted in a high degree of labour 
conflict, with associated costs to employers and the workforce.  
 Diversifying employment contracts: Mutual gains were strongest where strategies to diversify 
contracts did not result in substantial reduction in pay and employment conditions for existing 
employees, and where inequality between pay and conditions for similar employee groups was 
either kept at a minimum or reduced over time. TeliaSonera and A1 had the lowest levels of 
inequality of the case studies, both within the incumbents and across their subcontractors. Telecom 
Italia and France Telecom harmonized collective agreements across subsidiaries and business units 
over time, reducing inequality between internal groups of employees. Policies to negotiate 
concessions, introduce lower-tier collective agreements, or outsource to firms with lower pay 
structures provided labour cost savings but generated often unexpected costs through administrative 
complexity, labour conflict, increased turnover, and uneven service quality.  
 Work organization and human resource management: Mutual gains were strongest where 
employers adopted high involvement models of work organization and human resource 
management that invested in employee skills, placed limits on monitoring, focused on developing 
rather than disciplining employees, and involved some degree of employee control over work pace 
and content. We found evidence of ‘best practices’ in different areas across the case studies. France 
Telecom was investing in multi-skilled teams in technician workplaces; while Deutsche Telekom had 
negotiated creative agreements on performance management in call centres that preserved 
employee discretion. These practices can benefit employers by enhancing workforce acceptance of 
and cooperation with controversial practices like variable pay, as well as by reducing employee 
turnover and enhancing service quality.  
A final question concerns what factors encouraged incumbent firms to adopt best practices that 
resulted in strong mutual gains, when they were faced with similar pressures from increasingly 
competitive markets. Findings suggest that ownership and finance patterns, collective bargaining 
structures and rights, and employment protections played an important role in shaping strategies and 
outcomes: 
 Changing patterns of ownership and finance influenced the objectives associated with restructuring 
strategies pursued by incumbent firms. At all case study firms, privatization and increased pursuit of 
‘shareholder value’ encouraged a shift from a longer-term to a shorter-term orientation in 
investment and management decisions. Where ownership and finance was most internationalized, 
where debt-to-equity ratios were highest, and where national governments did not retain ownership 
stakes, we broadly observed the greatest pressure on management to engage in more radical 
restructuring associated with diversification of contracts and a focus on reducing labour costs. 
 Collective bargaining structures influenced differences in pay and conditions between 
telecommunications firms, across their subsidiaries, and between in-house and subcontracted or 
temporary agency employees. Countries with more encompassing agreements – which established 
similar pay structures for all or a majority of employees in similar jobs – experienced the least 
disruption in pay and conditions from restructuring measures, as well as the lowest resulting 
inequality between similar groups of employees. 
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 Participation rights held by employee representatives influenced their willingness and ability to 
partner with management over both restructuring strategies and work organization and HRM 
practices that produced mutual gains for employers and employees. Where employees enjoyed 
strong, legally protected participation or co-determination rights and where they had the ability to 
effectively use these rights, we observed the most innovative and cooperative approaches to 
managing employment adjustment, reorganizing work and skills, and implementing new 
performance management models.  
 Employment protections through national laws, special employment rights held by civil servants, or 
collective agreements constrained the options available to employers in downsizing employment and 
designing performance management practices. Stronger protections gave employers additional 
incentives to partner with unions over voluntary redundancy policies. Transfer of undertakings rules 
in the European countries helped to preserve pay and conditions for transferred employees in the 
short-term. Where it was more difficult to dismiss employees on performance grounds, employers 
had additional incentives to implement practices that incentivized performance through skill 
development and professionalism.  
The above factors did not fully determine the restructuring strategies of firms. Employers and employee 
representatives enjoy some degree of strategic choice in the goals that they pursue and the ways in 
which they engage with one another over these goals. This list is also not exhaustive. Government 
policies in a range of areas can provide incentives for cooperative approaches to restructuring – for 
example, support for reduced hours arrangements or subsidies for employee training and 
redeployment. However, we can conclude that national- and company-level differences in collective 
bargaining and labour market institutions were a central explanation for observed variation in 
management strategies in a number of areas. Institutions supporting employee voice in management 
decision-making helped to encourage alternative, partnership-based approaches to restructuring in the 
case studies examined here. Findings from this study suggest more broadly that ‘high road’ practices 
that preserve or enhance job quality are possible in settings in which employers are under strong 
pressure to reduce costs. These practices rely on longer-term investments in employee skill and 
commitment, and can complement efforts to improve productivity and service quality in increasingly 
competitive service markets. 
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